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Abstract†
The existence of asymmetries in factors substitutability between the distinct sectors of a
given economy will directly rule the influence that spillover effects have upon its determinacy
properties. For leading intersectoral spillover effects, the substitutability of the capital good
industry together with a potential relative profit shares reversal — itself conditional to the
existence of asymmetries between the intrasectoral and intersectoral spillover effects of at least
one sector — between the private and the equilibrium level will, e.g., be at the core of the
area for local indeterminacies. This proceeds from external dimensions which do not modify
the constant returns to scale hypothesis that is retained at the decentralised level of the firm
as they directly relate to equilibrium factors costs and outputs prices. The generality of the
current approach and the genericity of the associated production set enlighten the role of
the irregularities that prevail across the substitutability properties of the various sectors of a
given economy but also, in the same vein, of the occurrence of heterogeneities between the
intrasectoral and intersectoral spillovers emanating from a given industry, this gap being in turn
weighted by the substitutability properties of this industry. It is shown that these multiplicity
conclusions directly result from unusual properties of the Equilibrium Production Possibility
Frontier that formulate as the occurrence of an equilibrium complementarity between the two
outputs.
Keywords: 〈〈Equilibrium Production Possibility Frontiers 〉〉 – Intersectoral Asymmetries in Fac-
tors Substitutability and between Price related Intrasectoral and Intersectoral Spillovers – Ir-
relevance of returns to scale for local or global indeterminacies – Equilibrium complementarities
between the outputs in a world of heterogeneous goods.
†Mailing Address: C.n.r.s.-C.e.s./E.v.r.e.q.v.a., –, Boulevard de l’Hoˆpital, 75647 Paris Cedex 13,
France. Fax Number: 33–(0)1–44–07–82–02. E–Mail Address: jpdrug@asterix.univ-paris1.fr. Presented at
the Cendef Nonlinearities Workshop held in Amsterdam, January . This is an extension of the fourth
section of a more general purpose essay entitled 〈〈On the Production Possibility Frontier in Multi-Sectoral
Economies 〉〉 (Cahiers de la M.s.e. 1999.105). I am very much indebted to J.-P. Barinci for the recurrent
discussions we have had as well as for a very careful and detailed reading. Thanks also to A. d’Autume
for his suggestions and to an anonymous referee for constructive comments and suggestions. I bear the
entire responsability for any persistent omission or mistake.
Asymmetries in Factors Substitutabilities
I – Introduction
The existence of asymmetries in factors substitutability between the distinct sectors of a
given economy will be argued to directly rule the influence that intrasectoral or intersectoral
spillover effects will have upon its determinacy properties. Somewhat paradoxically, when
both production technologies tend to exhibit complementarity between the two inputs, and
for any equilibrium configuration of intrasectoral and intersectoral spillovers, the economy is
characterised by a unique locally determinate steady state. When it happens to be associated
with a relative profit shares reversal between the private and the equilibrium levels — the
production of the capital industry decreases with the aggregate capital input while the relative
rental rate of the capital input increases with the relative price of the capital output, that can
only occur when some discrepancies take place between the intrasectoral and intersectoral
spillovers that emanate from at least one sector — and for predominant intersectoral spillover
effects, arbitrarily low orders for the elasticity of substitution of the capital good industry
together with larger substitutability measures in the consumption good industry underlie
local indeterminacy. The basic argument proceeds from external spillover dimensions which
do not modify the constant returns to scale hypothesis that is retained at the decentralised
level of the firm as they directly relate to equilibrium factor costs and outputs prices. More
fundamentally and entirely new to the present contribution, the whole argument is established
through the introduction of an 〈〈equilibrium production possibility frontier 〉〉 whose features can
be characterised at the same level of generality as the canonical formulation of the production
possibility frontier, i.e., aside from any particular parametric formulation. The generality of
the current approach and the genericity of the associated production set enlighten the role
of the irregularities that prevail accross the substitutability properties in the productions of
the various goods of a given decentralised economy but also of the heterogeneities between
the intrasectoral and intersectoral spillovers emanating from a given industry, their influence
being in its turn weighted by the associated sectoral elasticity of substitution. Both of these
dimensions were out of order in the convex form of the multi-sectoral environment but also
happened to having been omitted from the earlier literature on local indeterminacies.
The role of factors substitutability in the emergence of local indeterminacies within competitive
economies has recently received a large attention with the contributions of Barinci [1],
Cazzavillan [13], Cazzavillan, Pintus & Lloyd-Braga [14], Grandmont, Pintus & de Vilder
[19]. Both Barinci [1] and Grandmont, Pintus & de Vilder [14] stress the possibility of
locally indeterminate stationary equilibria under complementary technologies. Cazzavillan
[13] and Cazzavillan, Pintus & Lloyd-Braga [14] circumvent the undesirable link between
complementarity and multipliticity by contemplating an economy exhibiting increasing returns
to scale. In particular, Cazzavillan, Pintus & Lloyd-Braga [14] put forth a potentially nonlinear
dimension for factors substitutability in indeterminacies: depending upon the degree of
increasing returns, both higly complementary and highly substitutable factors could bend
the economy towards the multiplicity result. A strong limit of their argument if however
inherent to their homogeneous good assumption, that implies a one to one trade-off between
consumption and investment: though this admittedly gives v a first convenient benchmark for
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the link between factors substitutability and indeterminacy, there is no doubt that a more
satisfactory argument ought to make an explicit account of the heterogenous determinants of
substitutability mechanisms in actually decentralised economies.
In parallel to this, the early literature concerned with the occurrence of local indeterminacies
has maintained a constant returns to scale hypothesis at the private level of sectoral production
technologies but allowed for increasing returns to scale at the equilibrium level, benchmark
studies in this vein being due to Benhabib & Farmer [2, 4], Boldrin & Rustichini [11],
Cazzavillan, Pintus & Lloyd-Braga [14] or Venditti [29]. This increasing returns component
having been criticised on an empirical data basis — this is lengthly documented by Benhabib
& Farmer [3] —, a second research program has, through the contributions of Benhabib &
Nishimura [8, 9] or Benhabib, Nishimura & Venditti [10], building upon a two-goods Cobb-
Douglas structure and thus a more satisfactory formulation for the production possibility
frontier and the trade-off between consumption and investment, retained a decreasing returns
to scale hypothesis — and thence profits — at the private level but constant, decreasing or
arbitrarily low increasing returns to scale at the equilibrium level. Nishimura & Venditti [22,
23] have parallely developed continuous time and discrete time C.E.S versions of this argument.
A shortcoming of all of these approaches springs from, as a direct byproduct of their exclusive
focus on parametric formulations, their inability in assessing, being thus in that perspective
not as satisfactory as the aggregate arguments of Barinci [1], Cazzavillan [13], Cazzavillan,
Pintus & Lloyd-Braga [14] or Grandmont, Pintus & de Vilder [19], the theoretical role of
factors substituability in the possibility of multiple equilibria.
Building upon the characterisation of substitutability mechanisms in multi-sectoral economies
introduced by Drugeon [15, 18], the current article completes the first unrestricted examination
of the potentially asymmetric role of sectoral factors substitutability in the determinacy
properties of suboptimal competitive economies. Further, in order to avoid lines of criticisms
pertaining to the role of the departure from the constant returns to scale hypothesis — be
it at the private or at the equilibrium level — in the occurrence of indeterminacies and in
opposition to the previous literature, the current argument neither departs from constant
returns to scale at the equilibrium level nor at the private level: this fundamentally proceeds
from the consideration of intrasectoral or intersectoral spillover effects which directly relate to
equilibrium levels of factors and output prices. Finally, the argument is completed for generic
formulations and a non-trivial first-order role for asymmetries in substitution mechanisms is
detected in the indeterminacy issue. On methodological grounds, the argument is established
through the introduction of an 〈〈equilibrium production possibility frontier 〉〉 — henceforwards
E.P.P.F. —, i.e., a P.P.F. characterised along the intertemporal competitive equilibrium with
As this will be mentioned in Section III through Remark 4 — a more detailed argument was completed in
Drugeon [17] — and in strong contradisctinction with the current contribution, the range of assumptions
used by Benhabib & Nishimura [8, 9] or Benhabib, Nishimura & Venditti [10] or Nishimura & Venditti
[22, 23] has as a central corollary that the potential for local indeterminacy results, be it for Cobb-
Douglas or C.E.S. technologies, rests upon a comparison between private and external factors shares,
factors substitutability being then inessential.
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externalities — henceforwards C.E.E. — that allows the analysis for attaining a level of
generality and theoretical understanding of the mechanics of a suboptimal two-goods world
which was absent from earlier studies, noticeably in the regards of the characterisation of the
heterogenous components of factors substitutability within multi-sectoral economies. Such a
local focus — along a competitive equilibrium with externalities — will be proved to bring
anew the possibility of a general understanding of the theoretical problem under examination,
i.e., an integrated view between local or global indeterminacy and factors substitutability with
a heterogenous goods technological set.
It is first established that the departure from the classical constant returns to scale hypothesis
is of no avail for the obtention of local or global indeterminacies as soon as a multi-sectoral
environment is explicitly considered — it can be proved that a homogeneous good setting
would not have been appropriate in that perspective. As a first illustration, multiple steady
states can emerge in any sectoral configuration as soon as both production tecnologies do
not tend to exhibit complementarity between the inputs, the examination of a parameterised
example further examplifying how multiple steady states may directly result from the existence
of intersectoral spillover effects stemming from the consumption good industry. When both
production technologies tend to exhibit complementarity between the two inputs, and for
any equilibrium configuration between intrasectoral and intersectoral spillovers, the economy
is characterised by a unique locally determinate steady state. As soon as positive factors
substitutability is allowed in at least one sector, the local determinacy properties result
from a permanent interplay between the asymmetries in factors substitutability across the
sectors and the discrepancies between the intrasectoral and the intersectoral spillovers that
emanate from a given sector. As an illustration, for dominating intersectoral spillover effects,
the substitutability of the capital good industry will be at the core of the area for local
indeterminacy. When it happens to be associated with a relative profit shares reversal between
the private and the equilibrium levels — the production of the capital industry decreases with
the aggregate capital input while the relative rental rate of the capital input increases with
the relative price of the capital output, that can only occur for asymmetric intrasectoral and
intersectoral spillovers in at least one industry —, arbitrarily low orders for the elasticity of
substitution of the capital good industry together with, for small intersectoral spillovers in
the production of the consumption good, larger substitutability measures in the consumption
good industry underlie local indeterminacy.
A remarkable outcome of the consideration of a suboptimal competitive equilibrium with
externalities and of the associated E.P.P.F. results from the features of the latter. An eventual
class of wonderings attempts at understanding these multiplicity results in light of its global
properties. This proceeds along two distinct roads. First, the scope for an equilibrium convexity
the E.P.P.F., in contradiction with the standard concavity of the P.P.F.,though present,
does not reveal to be intimately related to the lost of uniqueness, be it from a local or
from a global standpoint. Second, a related guess has then to do with the implications of
a variation in the competitive equilibrium with externalities relative price of the inputs on
the relative demand of these inputs, i.e., the value of the aggregate elasticity of substitution
between capital and labour in the course of the competitive equilibrium with externalities, an
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interesting point in that perspective being that, due to the assumed multiplicative separability
assumption between sectoral technologies and the spillovers components of the production
set, the canonical sectoral elasticities of substitution still provides an accurate description of
substitution mechanisms at the sectoral level. Such a line of argument does however not extend
to the aggregate level where it is proved that it is the scope for an E.P.P.F. characterised by an
increased role for factors substitutability with respect to its benchmark, best understood as the
potential for complementary outputs — this relates to the equilibrium atypical implications of
a modification in the relative price of the capital good on the relative levels of the two outputs
— that lies at the very core of the scope for local multiplicities.
A new type of constant returns to scale technological set is introduced in Section II and embed-
ded within a competitive setup. The E.P.P.F. and the associated competitive equilibrium with
externalities are introduced in Section III. The role of asymmetries in factors substitutabili-
ties between the different industries together with the role of equilibrium complementarities
between the outputs are shown in Section IV to directly underlie the scope for multiplicities.
Section V finally undertakes a comparison of the current line of argument with the more stan-
dard Benhabib & Nishimura’s 〈〈sectors specific 〉〉 argument and illustrates the usefulness of the
E.P.P.F. for the appraisal of this alternative setting, it also suggests some possible extensions
of the current line of argument. The main proofs are gathered in a final appendix.
II – A Multi-Sectoral Competitive Equilibrium with Externalities:
The Constant Returns to Scale Hypothesis
II.1 – A Canonical Approach
II.1.1 – A Representative Consumer
Time is discrete. The description of the preferences of the representative consumer amounts
to the introduction of an intertemporal utility functional V (·) defined over a consumption
sequence C = {ct}∞t= that assigns ct to any t = , ,  . . . :
V
(
C
)
=
+∞∑
t=
δtv
(
ct
)
, δ ∈ ], ],()
for v(·) an instantaneous utility function such that:
Assumption P.1: v(·) is a continuous, concave and increasing map from R+ into R. Further
v|
R
∗
+
∈ C
(
R
∗
+,R
)
and limc→∂v(c)/∂c = +∞ and limc→∞∂v(c)/∂c = .
At each time t ≥ , the representative consumer receives capital and labour income. The
capital incomes states as ωtX,t, for ωt the rental payment in units of consumption earned at
t by renting one unit of capital at the beginning of time t to the production sector and X,t
. . . 4. . .
Asymmetries in Factors Substitutabilities
capital holdings at date t = , , . . . The labour income of the representative household at time
t is denoted by ωtX, for ωt real wage rate measured in units of consumption and X,t = X
his invariant labour supply. The household budget constraint then formulates along:
ct + qt
[
X,t+ − (− η)X,t
]
= ωtX,t + ω

tX,()
for ct that denotes consumption at time t, qt the current price of capital in units of consumption
at time t and µ ∈], ] the depreciation rate of the capital stock. The household perfectly
anticipates the sequence of factor returns
{
ωt , ω

t
}
and the sequence of capital goods prices{
qt
}
. Given an expected sequence of factors returns, the representative household is to solve
the problem of maximising V
(
C
)
subject to (). The two necessary and sufficient conditions
for an optimal solution list as:
∂u
∂c
(
ct
)
− δ
∂u
∂c
(
ct+
)ωt+ + (− η)qt+
qt
= ,(a)
lim
t→+∞
δt
∂u
∂c
(
ct
)
qtX,t = .(b)
II.1.2 – A Technological Set
There are two sectors j = ,  in the economy At date t ≥ , the first produces a pure
consumption good in amount Y t whereas the second produces a pure capital good in amount
Y t . Any of the sectors uses labour and capital as inputs and the outputs of the consumption
and investment good sectors respectively satisfy:
Y t ≤ F

(
X,t, X,t;X
E
,t, X
E
,t, X
E
,t, X
E
,t
)
(a)
= F 
(
X,t, X,t
)
G
(
XE,t, X
E
,t
)
G
(
XE,t, X
E
,t
)
,
Y t ≤ F

(
X,t, X,t;X
E
,t, X
E
,t, X
E
,t, X
E
,t
)
(b)
= F 
(
X,t, X,t
)
G
(
XE,t, X
E
,t
)
G
(
XEj , X
E
j
)
,
where Xij,t denotes the amount of input i, i = , , employed in sector j, j = ,  at date
t = , , . . ., for F j(·, ·) that exhibits standard linear homogeneity and concavity properties
whereas Gjj(·, ·) and Gjj′(·, ·), j, j′ = , , j′ 6= j respectively denote functions that build
from intrasectoral and intersectoral externalities ; e.g., G(·, ·) and G(·, ·) refer to spillovers
stemming from the consumption good industry and respectively taking place in that industry
and in the capital good industry.
Both inputs are freely shiftable at any date between the two sectors:
X,t +X,t ≤ X,t,(a)
X,t +X,t ≤ X,t,(b)
whereas the value of next period capital stock is subject to:
X,t+ ≤ Y

t + (− η)X,t,()
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for η ∈ ], ] the depreciation rate of the capital stock.
The properties of the production technologies are restricted to the following list of assumptions:
Assumption T.1: ∀ j ∈ {, }, F j(·, ·) is homogeneous of degree one, concave and continuous
over R+ × R+.
Assumption T.2: ∀ j ∈ {, }, ∀Xj ∈ R+, F j
(
,Xj
)
= .
Assumption T.3: ∀X ∈ R+, F 
(
X, 
)
= .
Assumption T.4: There exists a level X¯ ∈ R∗+ such that, for all X ∈ R∗+, X ∈ R∗+,
F 
(
,X/X
)
> X/X for all X/X < X¯/X and F 
(
,X/X
)
< X/X for all
X/X > X¯/X.
Assumption T.5: ∀ j ∈ {, }, F j(·, ·) is of class C over R∗+ × R∗+.
Assumption T.6: ∀j ∈ {, }, ∀
(
Xj , Xj
)
∈ R∗+ × R
∗
+, ∂F j/∂Xj > , ∂F j/∂Xj > ,
∂F j/∂
(
Xj
)
< , ∂F j/∂
(
Xj
)
<  ; limXj→∂F j/∂Xj = +∞, limXj→∞∂F j/∂Xj =
, limXj→∂F j/∂Xj = +∞ and limXj→∞∂F j/∂Xj = .
Aside from these standard restrictions, a range of crucial assumptions pertain to the external
dimensions of the production set:
Assumption E.1: ∀ j, j′ ∈ {, }, j′ 6= j, Gjj(·, ·) and Gj′j(·, ·), are homogeneous of degree
zero, concave and continuous over R+ × R+.
Assumption E.2: ∀ j, j′ ∈ {, }, j′ 6= j, Gjj(·, ·) and Gj′j(·, ·) are of class C over R∗+ × R∗+.
Assumption E.3: ∀ j, j′ ∈ {, }, j′ 6= j, ∀
(
XEj,t, X
E
j,t
)
,
(
XEj′,t, X
E
j′,t
)
∈ R∗+ × R
∗
+,
∂Gjj/∂XEj > , ∂Gj
′j/∂XEj > .
A direct implication of Assumption E.1 is that there exists functions — not homogeneous
in the general case — G jj(·) and G j′j(·) such that Gjj
(
XEj,t, X
E
j
)
= Gjj
(
,XEj/X
E
j
)
: =
G jj
(
XEj/X
E
j
)
and Gj′j
(
XEj′ , X
E
j′
)
= Gj
′j
(
,XEj′/X
E
j′
)
: = G j
′j
(
XEj′/X
E
j′
)
. From Assump-
tions E.2 and E.3, G jj(·) and G j′j(·) are of class C and increasing as functions of the sectoral
capital - labour inputs ratios over R∗+. Conceptually, the linear homogeneity of Assumption
T.1 implies that factors prices will be homogeneous of degree zero in the arguments of the
production technologies.
Firms in sector j = ,  take
{
ωt , ω

t , qt
}
as given. They select
{
Xj,t, Xj,t
}
, j = , , in order
to maximise their profit functions ζjt , namely:
ζt := Max
{X,t,X,t}
Y t − ω

tX,t − ω

tX,t(a)
s.t. Y t ≤ F 
(
X,t, X,t
)
G
(
XE,t, X
E
,t
)
G
(
XE,t, X
E
,t
)
,
X,t ≥ ,X,t ≥ ,
ζt := Max
{X,t,X,t}
qtY

t − ω

tX,t − ω

tX,t(b)
s.t. Y t ≤ F 
(
X,t, X,t
)
G
(
XE,t, X
E
,t
)
G
(
XE,t, X
E
,t
)
,
X,t ≥ ,X,t ≥ .
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Capital and labour being freely shiftable from one sector to the other, they move so as to
equalise their rental rates at each between the two sectors. The constant returns to scale
hypothesis at the private level further implying the holding of ζt = ζt = , the existence of
an interior technological equilibrium will summarise to the satisfaction of the following set of
equations:
ωt =
∂F 
∂X
(
X,t, X,t
)
G
(
XE,t, X
E
,t
)
G
(
XE,t, X
E
,t
)
(a)
= qt
∂F 
∂X
(
X,t, X,t
)
G
(
XE,t, X
E
,t
)
G
(
XE,t, X
E
,t
)
,
ωt =
∂F 
∂X
(
X,t, X,t
)
G
(
XE,t, X
E
,t
)
G
(
XE,t, X
E
,t
)
(b)
= qt
∂F 
∂X
(
X,t, X,t
)
G
(
XE,t, X
E
,t
)
G
(
XE,t, X
E
,t
)
,
Y t = F

(
X,t, X,t
)
G
(
XE,t, X
E
,t
)
G
(
XE,t, X
E
,t
)
,(c)
Y t = F

(
X,t, X,t
)
G
(
XE,t, X
E
,t
)
G
(
XE,t, X
E
,t
)
,(d)
X,t = X,t +X,t,(e)
X,t = X,t +X,t.(f)
II.1.3 – A Competitive Equilibrium
Definition 1’. Under Assumptions P.1, T.1-6, E.1-3 and for a given E :=
{
Et
}∞
t=
,
for Et: =
{
XE,t/X
E
,t, X
E
,t/X
E
,t
}
, an intertemporal competitive equilibrium is a se-
quence
{
ΦEt
}+∞
t=
, ΦEt :=
{
X,t, X,t, X,t, X,t, ω

t , ω

t , qt, ct, X,t, X,t; E
}
∈ R+ ,{
ωt , ω

t , qt
}
∈ ℓ,
{
X,t, X,t
}
∈ ℓ∞, such that, for any t ≥ :
(i)
(
X,t, X,t
)
∈ Argmax ζ,t,
(
X,t, X,t
)
∈ Argmax ζ,t, ∀ t ≥  ;
(ii) ct = Y t = F 
(
X,t, X,t
)
G
(
XE,t, X
E
,t
)
G
(
XE,t, X
E
,t
)
;
(iii) X,t+ = F 
(
X,t, X,t
)
G
(
XE,t, X
E
,t
)
G
(
XE,t, X
E
,t
)
+ (− η)X,t ;
(iv) X,t = X ;
(v)
{
ct, X,t
}
maximises V
(
C ) subject to ct + qt
[
X,t+ − ( − η)X,t
]
= ωtX + ω

tX,t,
ct ≥ , ∀ t ≥  ;
(vi) Xj,t/Xj,t = Υ j
(
qt;X
E
,t/X
E
,t, X
E
,t/X
E
,t
)
is defined from (a–b).
II.2 – A Production Possibility Prontier Approach
II.2.1 – The Benchmark Structure
The subsequent exposition shall then be anchored on a substitutability argument that rests
upon an integrated view of outputs, inputs and prices in a two-goods world. This will in turn
allows for deriving the expression of the frontier of the production possiblity set, namely the
Production Possibility Frontier, and will endow the current multi-sectoral appraisal with a
simplified argument anchored on the levels of the outputs and the aggregate values of the
inputs.
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On a formal basis, this will correspond, starting from () and for a given Et: =
{
XE,t/X
E
,t,-
XE,t/X
E
,t
}
, to the establishment of a relationship between ωt /ωt and qt by making use of
their articulation with X,t/X,t and X,t/X,t through (a) and (b) and then integrating
this link into the equilibrium levels of the outputs (d) and (e) once the latters have been
amended by the expressions of µ,t = X,t/X and µ,t = X,t/X that are available from
(c). The equilibrium production of the two goods then deliver an integrated view of outputs,
inputs and prices according to
Y t = µ
(
X,t/X, qt
)
XF

[
,
(
X,t/X,t
)(
qt
)]
G
(
,XE,t/X
E
,t
)
G
(
,XE,t/X
E
,t
)
(a)
= F
(
X, X,t, qt;Et
)
,
Y t = µ
(
X,t/X, qt
)
XF

[
,
(
X,t/X,t
)(
qt
)]
G
(
,XE,t/X
E
,t
)
G
(
,XE,t/X
E
,t
)
(b)
= F
(
X, X,t, qt;Et
)
,
where any of the Fj(·, ·, ·;Et
)
is homogeneous of degree one with respect to X and X,t,
j = , . Eliminating the relative price qt between F
(
X¯, X,t, qt;Et
)
and F
(
X¯, X,t, qt,Et
)
,
the equation of the frontier of the production possiblity set, namely the one of the Production
Possibility Frontier that is parameterised by external effects, then describes the optimal
production of the consumption good for a given levels of the investment good and a given
pair of inputs and writes down as
Y t = T
(
Y t ;X, X,t;X
E
,t/X
E
,t, X
E
,t/X
E
,t
)
,()
for the function T
(
·; ·, ·;Et
)
that features the frontier of the production possibility set. For
future reference, building upon Assumption T.2 and from a technical argument available as
[], the homogeneity of degree one of F j(·, ·), j = , , translates as the linear homogeneity
of T (·; ·, ·;Et) in Y t , X and X,t. The set of triples
(
Y t , X, X,t
)
such that the set of feasible
allocations is non-void is identical to the hypograph of the function F (·, ·;Et) as defined by
Gr
(
F ;Et
)
:=
{(
Y , X, X
)
∈ R+ | Y
 ≤ F 
(
X, X;Et
)}
.
It can be shown that Y /X = F 
(
,X/X;Et
)
denotes the solution to T
(
Y ;X, X;Et
)
=
, the earlier private assumptions T.1-6 restating in the following way in terms of the production
possibility frontier:
Assumption T.1’: There exists X¯ such that for any X/X ∈
]
, X¯/X
[
, T
(
Y ;X,-
X;Et
)
=  implies F 
(
,X/X;Et
)
> X/X and for any X/X > X¯/X,
T
(
Y ;X, X;Et
)
implies F 
(
,X/X;Et
)
< X/X.
Assumption T.2’: Letting
(
Y ;X, 
)
∈ Gr
(
F ;Et
)
, then Y  =  and , T
(
Y ;X, ;Et
)
=
F 
(
X, ;Et
)
.
Assumption T.3’: T
(
Y ;X, X;Et
)
is concave over Gr
(
F ;Et
)
, continuous and of class C
over int
[
Gr
(
F ;Et
)]
with ∂T/∂Y  < , ∂T/∂X > , ∂T/∂X > , ∂T/∂
(
Y 
)
≤ ,
∂T/∂
(
X
)
< , ∂T/∂
(
X
)
< , ∂T/∂Y ∂X S  and ∂T/∂Y ∂X T  for
X/X T X/X and ∂T/∂X∂X > .
A more detailed argument is available in the technical appendix of [].
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The hallmark of this alternative approach of the P.P.F. being however his emphasis on
price and substitution mechanisms, it is useful to introduce the respective aggregate shares,
e.g., of consumption and profits in national income, as πY  : = pY /
(
pY  + pY 
)
and
πX¯ : = ω
X/
(
ωX + ω
X
)
and, at a disaggregated level, the elasticity of substitution
between the two inputs and the sectoral share of profits in total production cost accruing to
the capital input, i.e., the share of profits in sector j, as ΣjXX : =
(
∂F j/∂Xj
)(
∂F j/∂Xj
) /
F j
(
∂F j/∂Xj∂Xj
)
and πjX : = ωXj/pjY j , where it is noted that πX¯ = πY πX +πY πX .
Reformulating () along
Y t
Y t
=
F
(
,X,t/X, qt;X
E
,t/X
E
,t, X
E
,t/X
E
,t
)
F
(
,X,t/X, qt;XE,t/X
E
,t, X
E
,t/X
E
,t
) ,
it is proved in Drugeon [15, 18] that, for given level of outputs, the aggregate elasticity of
substitution between the two inputs X and X boils down to
ΣX¯X¯ =
(
πXπ

XπY Σ

XX + π

Xπ

XπY Σ

XX
)
/πX¯πX¯
while, for given amounts of both aggregate inputs, the elasticity of substitution between the
two outputs Y  and Y  is available as ΣY Y  = ΣX¯X¯πX¯πX¯/
(
πX − π

X
)
πY πY  .
The features of the functions Fj
(
·, ·, ·;Et
)
are easily characterised and provide a first hint to
the ones of the P.P.F. From (), the matrix of the first-order derivatives with respect to the
inputs lists as:

πX − π

X
[
πY  
 πY 
]− [
πX −π

X
−πX π

X
] [
πX¯ 
 πX¯
]
while the equilibrium matrix that relates the vector of outputs to the vector of costs states as:
−
ΣX¯X¯πX¯πX¯
πX − π

X
[
πY  
 πY 
]− [
−

]
.
The elasticities of T (·; ·, ·;Et) with respect to its three arguments are then respectively
given by πY /πY  , πX/πY  and πX/πY  , where qt = −∂T
(
Y t ;X, X,t;Et
)
/∂Y , ωt =
∂T
(
Y t ;X, X,t;Et
)
/∂X and ωt = ∂T
(
Y t ;X, X,t;Et
)
/∂X. Finally, the components of the
negative-definite matrix of weighted — by factors and product shares in national income —
elasticities —, e.g.,
ΞY Y  : =
∂T
∂
(
Y 
)(T − ∂T∂Y Y 
) / (
∂T
∂Y 
)
.
associated to the second-order derivatives of T
(
Y ;X, X;Et
)
will repeatedly be refered
to. Letting A′ = [  −πX/
(
πX − π

X
) (
− πX
)
/
(
πX − π

X
)
] and MΞ denote this
Hessian Elasticities Matrix of the production possibility frontier, it can be shown to be of rank
 and available as
MΞ = A
[
−
(
πX − π

X
)
πX¯πX¯ΣX¯X¯
]
A′,()
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where it is noted that the intersectoral comparison inherent to the coefficient πX − πX
has direct implications on the intrasectoral structures since
(
πX − π

X
)
πY πY /πX¯πX¯ =(
πX/πX¯ − π

X
/πX¯
)
πY  . Two stringent dimensions of the two-sector world described by
Assumptions T.1–6 are thus that the matrix MΞ is of rank  and symmetrical.
II.2.2 – A Parameterised Production Possibility Frontier
With respect to its canonical definition associated to a range of assumptions such as T.1-6,
the particularity of the current definition of the P.P.F. stems from its parameterisation, under
Assumptions E.1-3, by XE,t/XE,t and XE,t/XE,t. For the level definition of the P.P.F., this
dependency boils down to a pair of coefficients
πXE
j
/XE
j
: =
[
∂T/∂
(
XEj/X
E
j
)](
XEj/X
E
j
) / [
T −
(
∂T/∂Y 
)
Y 
]
, j = , .
For its first-order derivatives, i.e., for competitive prices, this dependency will be illustrated
through a matrix of terms such as
ΞX(XEj/XEj)
:=
[
∂T/∂X∂
(
XEj/X
E
j
)][(
∂T/∂X
)
X +
(
∂T/∂X
)
X
](
∂T/∂X
)[
∂T/∂
(
XEj/X
E
j
)] , j = , .
Letting also πEjj′X : =
(
∂Gjj
′
/∂XEj
)
XEj/G
jj′ j, j′ = ,  and for future reference, the two facets
of this parameterisation are gathered in the following statement:
Lemma 1 [The Parameterised P.P.F. T
(
·; ·, ·;Et
)
]. Under Assumptions T.1-6, E.1-3:
(i) the first-order level dependency of the P.P.F. with respect to XE,t/XE,t and XE,t/XE,t
states as the following vector:
[πXE/XE πXE/XE ] =
[
πY π
E
X
+ πY π
E
X
πY π
E
X
+ πY π
E
X
]
;
(ii) the second-order 〈〈price 〉〉 dependency of the vector
[
ωt ω

t qt
]′
with respect to
XE,t/X
E
,t and X
E
,t/X
E
,t states as the matrix:
ΞY (XE/XE) ΞY (XE/XE)ΞX(XE/XE) ΞX(XE/XE)
ΞX(XE/XE) ΞX(XE/XE)
 = B [πXE/XE 
 πXE/XE
]
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for B = −


πX
πX − π

X
−
− πX
πX − π

X

[
−
(
πX − π

X
)
πX¯πX¯ΣX¯X¯
]
×

−
(
πEX − π
E
X
)
πX¯πX¯ΣX¯X¯(
πX − π

X
) + πEX
−
(
πEX − π
E
X
)
πX¯πX¯ΣX¯X¯(
πX − π

X
) + πEX

′
+

 
−
πX
(
πEX − π
E
X
)
πX − π

X
+ πEX −
πX
(
πEX − π
E
X
)
πX − π

X
+ πEX
πX
(
πEX − π
E
X
)
πX − π

X
+ πEX
πX
(
πEX − π
E
X
)
πX − π

X
+ πEX

;
(iii) sectoral demands state in terms of the arguments and parameters of the P.P.F. as
Xj,t/Xj,t = Ψ
j
(
Y t ;X, X,t;X
E
,t/X
E
,t, X
E
,t/X
E
,t
)
, j = , , where the features of
Ψ j
(
·; ·, ·;Et
)
derive, letting µij = Xij/Xi, i, j = , , from:
−
∂T
∂Y 
(
Y t ;X, X,t;X
E
,t/X
E
,t, X
E
,t/X
E
,t
)
=
πX
(
X,t/X,t
)
πY 
(
Y t /X, X,t/X
)
πX
(
X,t/X,t
)
πY 
(
Y t /X, X,t/X
) ,
πX
(
X,t/X,t
)
πX
(
X,t/X,t
) = πX(X,t/X,t)
πX
(
X,t/X,t
) µµ
µµ
·
Proof : Vide Appendix V.1. △
It is worth noticing from (i) how Assumptions E.1-3 have as an immediate implication that the
production possibility possibility frontier uncovers a positive dependency with repect to the
external acceptations of the sectoral capital-labour ratios, no such clear-cut conclusion being
oppositely available for the second-order price dependency described through (ii).
II.2.3 – A Competitive Equilibrium
Definition 1. Under Assumptions P.1, T.1-6, E.1-3 and for a given E :=
{
Et
}∞
t=
, an in-
tertemporal competitive equilibrium is a sequence
{
ΦEt
}+∞
t=
, ΦEt :=
{
X,t, X,t, ω

t , ω

t , qt,
Y t , Y

t ; E
}
∈ R+,
{
ωt , ω

t , qt
}
∈ ℓ,
{
X,t, X,t
}
∈ ℓ∞ such that, for any t ≥ :
(i)
(
X,t, Y,t
)
maximises T
(
Y t ;X, X,t;Et
)
+qtY

t −ω

tX,t over the domain of T (·; ·, ·;Et
)
;
(ii) ωtX,t = T
(
Y t ;X, X,t;Et
)
+ qtY

t − ω

tX,t ;
(iii) ct = Y t = T
(
Y t ;X,t, X,t;Et
)
;
(iv) X,t+ = Y t + (− η)X,t ;
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(v) X,t = X ;
(vi)
{
ct, X,t
}
maximises V
(
C ) subject to ct + qtY t = ωtX + ωtX,t, ct ≥  and
Xj,t/Xj,t = Ψ
j
(
Y t ;X, X,t;X
E
,t/X
E
,t, X
E
,t/X
E
,t
)
, j = , , ∀ t ≥ .
Competitive equilibria are then proficiently characterised as solution sequences to a parame-
terised optimisation problem P∞
(
E
)
:
Max
{X,t,Y t }
∞∑
t=
δt(v ◦ T )
(
Y t ;X, X,t;Et
)
s.t. ();X, ∈
[
,X
]
, δ ∈ ], ],()
Xj,t/Xj,t = Ψ
j
(
Y t ;X, X,t;X
E
,t/X
E
,t, X
E
,t/X
E
,t
)
, j = , .
For a given set of external sequences E, necessary and sufficient conditions for
{
λt
}∞
t=
to be
a sequence of support prices to the optimal trajectory state as:
∂v
∂c
[
T
(
Y t ;X, X,t;Et
)
]
∂T
∂Y 
(
Y t ;X, X,t;Et
)
+ δλt+ = ,(a)
∂v
∂c
[
T
(
Y t ;X, X,t;Et
)
]
∂T
∂X
(
Y t ;X, X,t;Et
)
+ δλt+(− η)− λt = ,(b)
X,t+ − Y

t − (− η)X,t = ,(c)
lim
t→+∞
δtX,tλt = .(d)
III – The 〈〈Equilibrium Production Possibility Frontier 〉〉
& The associated Competitive Equilibrium with Externalities
This section aims at a characterisation of the benchmark technological set along a competitive
equilibrium with externalities
III.1 – The E.P.P.F. & the C.E.E.: A Definition
Assuming that there exists a solution XE :=
{
X,t;Et}
∞
t= to P∞
(
E
)
and that the associated
set of external sequences further satisfies:
qt =
[
∂F 
(
,X,t/X,t
)
/∂X
]
G
(
,X,t/X,t
)
G
(
,X,t/X,t
)[
∂F 
(
,X,t/X,t
)
/∂X
]
G
(
,X,t/X,t
)
G
(
,X,t/X,t
) ,(a)
= −
∂T
∂Y 
(
Y ;X, X;X,t/X,t, X,t/X,t
)
∂F 
(
,X,t/X,t
)
/∂X
∂F 
(
,X,t/X,t
)
/∂X
=
∂F 
(
,X,t/X,t
)
/∂X
∂F 
(
,X,t/X,t
)
/∂X
,(b)
or, along the notation of Lemma 1(iii) and Definition 1:
X,t/X,t = Ψ

(
Y t ;X, X,t;X,t/X,t, X,t/X,t
)
,(′a)
X,t/X,t = Ψ

(
Y t ;X, X,t;X,t/X,t, X,t/X,t
)
,(′b)
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an externality augmented system of demand functions XE ,⋆j,t/XE ,⋆j,t = Ψ j,E
(
Y t ;X, X,t
)
becomes available. It shall more compactly be refered to in vector form throughout the
subsequent argument: Ê
(
Y t , X, X,t
)
: =
{
Ψ jE
(
Y t ;X, X,t
)}
, j = , .
From the terminology of Kehoe, Levine & Romer [], it is the consideration of the extra fixed
point-side condition () that allows for recovering a symmetric C.E.E. through a centralised
optimisation problem. Beforehand, it is worth introducing an equilibrium benchmark structure
for the production technology:
Definition 2. [The 〈〈Equilibrium Production Possibility Frontier 〉〉] Under Assumptions
T.1-6, E.1-3, P.1, the E.P.P.F. is jointly defined
(i) from a level given by Y t = T E
(
Y t ;X, X,t
)
: = T
(
Y t ;X, X,t; Ê
(
Y t , X, X,t
))
,
(ii) from first-order derivatives associated to the equilibrium competitive prices as
qt = −
(
∂T
∂Y 
)E (
Y t ;X, X,t
)
: = −
∂T
∂Y 
(
Y t ;X, X,t; Ê
(
Y t , X, X,t
))
;
ωt =
(
∂T
∂X
)E (
Y t ;X, X,t
)
: =
∂T
∂X
(
Y t ;X, X,t; Ê
(
Y t , X, X,t
))
;
ω =
(
∂T
∂X
)E (
Y t ;X, X,t
)
: =
∂T
∂X
(
Y t ;X, X,t; Ê
(
Y t , X, X,t
))
.
Remark 1: The definition of an E.P.P.F. admittedly introduces a range of unusual formal
intricacies: for instance, ∂T E /∂Y  6=
(
∂T/∂Y 
)E while the main features of an E.P.P.F. result
from the existence of a fixed-point solution to a infinite dimensional problem over time and
thus cannot – in contradiction with a canonical P.P.F. the properties of which are based
upon a production set that is invariant accross time –, be analysed on the sole basis of a
technological eqauilibrium. Nevertheless, by narrowing the focus to a local appraisal along the
symmetric C.E.E., i.e., to level and prices components respectively available as (i) and (ii), the
current approach anew equips the analysis with an E.P.P.F. formulation T E (·; ·, ·
)
that affixes
the reasoning upon a tractable and unrestricted aggregate structure, such a generality having
been up to now restrained to competitive settings anchored on a standard time-invariant P.P.F.
♦
The definition of a symmetric multi-sectoral competitive equilibria with externalities happens
to be significantly simplified.
Definition 3. Under Assumptions P.1, T.1-6, E.1-3, an intertemporal symmetric competi-
tive equilibrium with externalities is a sequence
{
Φ̂t
}+∞
t=
, Φ̂t :=
{
X,t, X,t, ω

t , ω

t , qt,
Y t , Y

t
}
∈ R+,
{
ωt , ω

t , qt
}
∈ ℓ,
{
X,t, X,t
}
∈ ℓ∞ such that, for any t ≥ :
(i) qt = −
[
∂T
(
Y t ;X, X,t
)
/∂Y 
]E , ωt = [∂T (Y t ;X, X,t)/∂X]E , ωt = [∂T (Y t ;X,-
X,t
)
/∂X
]E ;
(ii) ωtX,t = T E
(
Y t ;X, X,t
)
+ qtY

t − ω

tX,t ;
(iii) ct = Y t = T E
(
Y t ;X,t, X,t
)
;
(iv) X,t+ = Y t + (− η)X,t ;
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(v) X,t = X ;
(vi)
{
ct, X,t, Y

t
}
maximises V
(
C ) subject to ct + qtY t = ωtX + ωtX,t, ct ≥  , ∀ t ≥ .
The intertemporal competitive equilibrium with externalities will hence be represented by the
following equilibrium restatement of the necessary and sufficient conditions on
{
λt
}∞
t=
:
∂v
∂c
[
T E
(
Y t ;X, X,t
)
]
(
∂T
∂Y 
)E (
Y t ;X, X,t
)
+ δλt+ = ,(
′a)
∂v
∂c
[
T E
(
Y t ;X, X,t
)
]
(
∂T
∂X
)E (
Y t ;X, X,t
)
+ δλt+(− η)− λt = ,(
′b)
X,t+ − Y

t − (− η)X,t = ,(
′c)
lim
t→+∞
δtX,tλt = .(
′d)
III.2 – The E.P.P.F.: A Characterisation
One of the decisive advantages of letting the appraisal of a multi-sectoral setting rest
upon a P.P.F. has to do with the gathering of any equilibrium formal intricacy within the
properties of an aggregate function. The aim of this section will then be to complete a related
characterisation for an E.P.P.F.
As this is enlightened by the following statement, the features of the externality augmented
system of demand functions XE ,⋆j,t/XE ,⋆j,t = Ψ j,E
(
Y t ;X, X,t
)
, that assume almost any of
the analytically tractable properties of its standard definition that appear in Lemma 1(ii),
are a direct corollary of the competitive equilibrium with externalities relationship between[ (
X/X
)E
X/X
)E ]′ and the relative price of the capital good qt:
Lemma 2 [The Equilibrium System of Demands]. Under Assumptions T.1-6,E.1-3, P.1, letting
Γ E : =
(
πX − π

X
)
+
(
πEX − π
E
X
)
ΣXX +
(
πEX − π
E
X
)
ΣXX :
(i) the vector that relates the equilibrium system of demands to the relative price of the
capital good is available as(
Γ E
)− [ΣXX
ΣXX
]
;
(ii) the matrix that relates the equilibrium system of demands to the aggregate arguments of
the P.P.F. states as:(
Γ E
)− [ΣXX
ΣXX
][
−
(
πX − π

X
)
πX¯πX¯ΣX¯X¯
] [
 −
πX
πX − π

X
− πX
πX − π

X
]
.
Proof : Vide Appendix V.2. △
Along Section II.2, a first hint of the features of the E.P.P.F. builds from an integrated view
of outputs, stocks and prices, namely:
Y t = F

[
X¯, X,t, qt;
(
X,t/X,t
)E (
qt
)
,
(
X,t/X,t
)E (
qt
)]
(a)
= FE ,
(
X¯, X¯,t, qt
)
,
Y t = F

[
X¯, X,t, qt;
(
X,t/X,t
)E (
qt
)
,
(
X,t/X,t
)E (
qt
)]
(b)
= FE ,
(
X¯, X¯,t, qt
)
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The first-order features of these equilibrium functions are gathered in the following statement:
Lemma 3 [The Competitive Equilibrium with Externalities Productions of Y t and Y t ].
Under Assumptions P.1, T.1-6, E.1-3:
(i) the equilibrium matrix that relates the vector of outputs to the vector of inputs states as:

πX − π

X
[
πY  
 πY 
]− [
πX −π

X
−πX π

X
] [
πX¯ 
 πX¯
]
;
(ii) the equilibrium matrix that relates the vector of outputs to the relative price of the capital
good industry states as:
πX¯πX¯ΣX¯X¯(
πX − π

X
)
Γ E
[
πY  
 πY 
]−
×
−−
πY 
(
πX − π

X
)
πX¯πX¯ΣX¯X¯
(
πEX Σ

XX + π
E
X
ΣXX
)
−
πY 
(
πX − π

X
)
πX¯πX¯ΣX¯X¯
(
πEX Σ

XX + π
E
X
ΣXX
)
 .
Proof : Vide Appendix V.3. △
Interestingly and as described by Lemma 3(i), the dependencies of the outputs w.r.t. stocks
remain unaltered and the details of the Rybczinsky Theorem are unmodified with respect to
a convex environment, e.g., the more than unitary coefficient that relies the production of the
investment good to the capital stock. In opposition to this and as this appears from Lemma
3(ii), the relation that these outputs assume with respect to the relative price of the capital good
is augmented by the existence of spillover effects. It is also noted that while such a dependency
solely involved aggregate substitution mechanisms, i.e., the coefficient ΣX¯X¯ , in a convex
structure, the consideration of a suboptimal environment introduces an asymmetry between
sectoral substitution mechanisms that cannot any longer be merged into an aggregate measure
of substitutability and hence opens room for a preeminant role of substitution asymmetries in
the analysis.
Finally introducing the second-order weighted elasticities of the E.P.P.F. along
ΞEY Y  : =
[
∂
(
∂T/∂Y 
)E
/∂Y 
][
T −
(
∂T/∂Y 
)E
Y 
][
−
(
∂T/∂Y 
)E ]
= ΞY Y  +ΞY (XE/XE)Ξ(X̂/X̂)Y 
+ΞY (XE/XE)Ξ(X̂/X̂)Y 
()
and looking for a deeper understanding of the sectoral underpinnings of the E.P.P.F. is going
to uncover a tractable structure for the Hessian elasticities matrix that will recover such an
asymmetry between sectoral substitution mechanisms :
An entirely equivalent way of reaching such a coefficient proceeds from the elimination of qt between
Y t = F
E ,
(
X¯, X¯,t, qt
)
and Y t = FE ,
(
X¯, X¯,t, qt
)
.
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Proposition 1 [The Hessian Elasticities Matrix of the E.P.P.F.]. Consider a competitive
equilibrium with externalities defined under Assumptions T.1-6, E.1-3, P.1. Then, for
ZE := −
(
πX − π

X
)
πY πY 
ΣX¯X¯πX¯πX¯
(
πEX Σ

XX + π
E
X
ΣXX
)
,
assuming ZE 6= , the Hessian elasticities matrix of the E.P.P.F. states as:
[
MΞE
]
=


πX + π
E
X
ΣXX + π
E
X
ΣXX
Γ E
−
− πX − π
E
X
ΣXX − π
E
X
ΣXX
Γ E

[
−
(
πX − π

X
)
Γ E
πX¯πX¯ΣX¯X¯Z
E
]
×
[

πX
πX − π

X
−
− πX
πX − π

X
]
.
Proof : Vide Appendix V.4. △
It is noteworthy to underline that, comparing the matrix MΞE with its canonical formulation
MΞ , it remains of rank  and that ΞEij/ΞEik is still equal to ΞEjj/ΞEjk, for i, j, k = Y , X, X.
The usual duality between the outputs Rybczinski effects and the price Stolper-Samuelson
effects is however lost with the current E.P.P.F and this implies that M EΞ is not any
longer a symmetrical matrix. Confirming in that respect the insights of Lemma 3, while
ΞEij 6= Ξ
E
ji, the effects that pertain to the products and the factors inputs, e.g., the ratio
ΞEY X/Ξ
E
Y Y  = −
(
 − πX
)
/
(
πX − π

X
)
, remain unaltered while the Stolper-Samuelson
ones that relate inputs and output prices, e.g.,
ΞEXY /Ξ
E
Y Y  = −
− πX − π
E
X
ΣXX − π
E
X
ΣXX(
πX − π

X
)
+
(
πEX − π
E
X
)
ΣXX +
(
πEX − π
E
X
)
ΣXX
,()
are modified by the consideration of external dimensions. Actually, the newest and most
atypical dimension of the matrix M EΞ springs from the explicit appearance of sectoral
elasticities of substitution in its definition. Otherwise stated, the equilibrium articulation
between, e.g., the rental rate of the capital stock and the price of the capital good, is now
directly influenced by the elasticity of substitution in the production of the capital good but
also by the elasticity of substitution in the production of the consumption good, both effects
disappearing when both production technologies tend to exhibit complementarity between
factors, i.e., for ΣjXX → , j = , .
Remark 2: The obtention of lists of coefficients such as () being however admittedly
demanding on a formal basis, an alternative approach for establishing the structure of the
This contradicts with the standards of trade theory where only factors shares were involved but also, as
explained through Remark 4, with the most frequently used specifications in the recent characterisation
of multi-sectoral competitive equilibria with externalities.
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matrix MΞE proceeds, along the lines of the argument developed by [18] in the convex case,
from an analysis that rests upon the equilibrium articulation between the vector of factors
costs and the ratio X,t/X for any linearly homogeneous T E (·; ·, ·). Restating indeed the
price component of the E.P.P.F. according to:
qt = −
(
∂T
∂Y 
)E (
Y t /X; ,X,t/X
)
;(a)
ωt =
(
∂T
∂X
)E (
Y t /X; ,X,t/X
)
;(b)
ωt =
(
∂T
∂X
)E (
Y t /X; ,X,t/X
)
.(c)
and differentiating this system of equations, the insertion of (a), namely the expression of
Y t /X as a function of Xt /X and qt into (b) and (c), allows for expressing ωt and
ωt as functions of X,t/X and qt. Noticing however that a simple glance at the symmetric
competitive equilibrium with externalities formulation of the decentralised version of the first-
order conditions (a-b), namely:
ωt =
∂F 
∂X
(
,X,t/X,t
)
G
(
,X,t/X,t
)
G
(
,X,t/X,t
)
(a)
= qt
∂F 
∂X
(
,X,t/X,t
)
G
(
,X,t/X,t
)
G
(
,X,t/X,t
)
,
ωt =
∂F 
∂X
(
,X,t/X,t
)
G
(
,X,t/X,t
)
G
(
,X,t/X,t
)
(b)
= qt
∂F 
∂X
(
,X,t/X,t
)
G
(
,X,t/X,t
)
G
(
,X,t/X,t
)
,
unambiguously indicates that the dependency of the vector of factors prices with respect to the
aggregate capital-labour ratio X,t/X is to cancel down to zero, this in turn implies similar
values for any of the components of the following vector computed from the integration of
(a) into (b) and (c):
(
ΞEXX −
ΞEXY 
ΞEY Y 
ΞEY X
)
πX¯(
ΞEXX −
ΞEXY 
ΞEY Y 
ΞEY X
)
πX¯
 .()
This hence uncovers the rank one stucture of the Hessian elasticities matrix raised through
Proposition 1. The explicit expressions of the coefficients can then be computed by hinging on
the linear homogeneity of T E (·; ·, ·). ♦
Remark 3: An alternative formulation of the externalities set would stem from a pair of
production technologies F j
(
Xj , Xj
)
Hj
(
XE,t, X
E
,t
)
for Hj(·, ·) that is homogeneous of degree
zero. Such formulations are comparable to the ones delimited by Assumptions E.1-3 in the
regards that returns to scale are unaffected by the consideration of a suboptimal competitive
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equilibrium. As an illustration, it can be shown that the equilibrium Hessian elasticities matrix
of Proposition 1 then reformulates to:


−
πX
πX − π

X
− πX
πX − π

X

[
−
(
πX − π

X
)
πX¯πX¯ΣX¯X¯
]


−
πX
πX − π

X
−
(
πEX − π
E
X
)
πX¯πX¯ΣX¯X¯(
πX − π

X
) − πEX
− πX
πX − π

X
−
(
πEX + π
E
X
)
πX¯πX¯ΣX¯X¯(
πX − π

X
) + πEX

′
+


−
πX
(
πEX − π
E
X
)
πX − π

X
− πEX
πX
(
πEX − π
E
X
)
πX − π

X
− πEX

[  −  ] .
Having a glance at the first element of this summation, this rather complex structure starts
from the exact contraposite of the one that is considered in this contribution, i.e., the column
price structure is unaffected while the row line components all differ from the one of the convex
structure: while ΞEij 6= ΞEji, the effects that pertain to the products and the factors inputs, e.g.,
the ratio ΞEY X/ΞEY Y  , are modified while some, but not all, ratios that relate inputs and
output prices, e.g., ΞEXY /ΞEY Y  , are unaffected by the consideration of external dimensions.
A great difficulty in pursuing further the characterisation of the associated equilibrium would
however spring from the second component of this summation, that entails a loss of symmetry
plus a rank of two, i.e., ΞEjj−ΞEjj′ΞEj′j/ΞEj′j′ 6= , j, j′ = Y , X, X, j 6= j′, for the E.P.P.F. To
sum up, though formally related, such a formulation conceptually differs and entails entirely
distinct theoretical implications on the production set. ♦
III.3 – The Scope for a Convex E.P.P.F. & Complementary Outputs
A remarkable outcome of the consideration of a suboptimal competitive equilibrium external-
ities and of the associated E.P.P.F. results from the features of the latter. While the preceding
section made clear that some key properties of the Hessian elasticities matrix were left unaf-
fected, it remains to wonder in which regards this E.P.P.F. still describes a traditional trade-off
between the consumption and the investment outputs. The rank one E.P.P.F. shall be refered
to as being convex if there exists some parameter configuration under which either any of
its principal diagonal components happens to become positive or some become positive while
others keep on being negative but their sum is of positive sign. The scope for the actual range
of such a configuration is delimited through the following statement:
Lemma 4 [A Convex E.P.P.F.]. The E.P.P.F. describes a convex function if one of the two
following configurations prevails:
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(i) ZE = −
(
πX − π

X
)
πY πY 
(
πEX Σ

XX
+πEX Σ

XX
)
/ΣX¯X¯πX¯πX¯ <  and the two
following inequalities simultaneously hold:(
πX − π

X
)[(
πX − π

X
)
+
(
πEX − π
E
X
)
ΣXX +
(
πEX − π
E
X
)
ΣXX
]
> ,
− πX − π
E
X
ΣXX − π
E
X
ΣXX > ;
(ii) ZE =  −
(
πX − π

X
)
πY πY 
(
πEX Σ

XX
+ πEX Σ

XX
)
/ΣX¯X¯πX¯πX¯ >  and the
three following inequalities simultaneously hold:(
πX − π

X
)[(
πX − π

X
)
+
(
πEX − π
E
X
)
ΣXX +
(
πEX − π
E
X
)
ΣXX
]
< ,
− πX − π
E
X
ΣXX − π
E
X
ΣXX < ,
πX
(
πX + π
E
X
ΣXX + π
E
X
ΣXX
)
<
(
− πX
)(
− πX − π
E
X
ΣXX
− πEX Σ

XX
)
.
Proof : Vide Appendix V.5. △
A related guess has then to do with the implications of a variation in the competitive
equilibrium with externalities relative price of the inputs ωt /ωt on the relative demand of
these inputs X,t/X, i.e., the value of the aggregate elasticity of substitution between capital
and labour in the course of the competitive equilibrium with externalities, an interesting point
in that perspective being that, due to the multiplicative separability assumption that underlies
the representations () for the sectoral production technologies, the ensued inputs prices
ratio ωt /ωt , when considered along a symmetric competitive equilibrium with externalities,
happens not to be modified with respect to its standard representation and hence assumes the
same expressions with respect to any of the Xj,t/Xj,t, j = , . Otherwise stated, ΣjXX
still provides an accurate description substitution mechanisms that occur in sector j = , .
As this was however clarified by Lemma 2, the competitive equilibrium with externalities
formulations
(
Xj,t/Xj,t
)E are modified as functions of qt = −[∂T (Y t ;X, X,t)/∂Y ]E ,
that is homogeneous of degree zero in Y t , X and X,t. This will in turn entail a modified
articulation with, e.g., the ratio X,t/X, that in turn lies at the very core of the articulation
between ωt /ωt and X,t/X that pictures factors substitutability at the aggregate level. In the
same vein, recalling the formal articulation between this coefficient and the one that describes
the implications of a modification in the relative price of the capital good qt on the relative
level of the outputs Y t /Y t , it remains to wonder in which regards such a coefficient is modified
by the consideration of a competitive equilibrium with externalities.
Lemma 5 [C.E.E. Arbitrages & the Scope for Equilibrium Complementarities]. The
E.P.P.F. is such that:
(i) The equilibrium elasticities of substitution between the aggregate inputs ΣE
X¯X¯
and the
outputs ΣEY Y  respectively formulate along:
ΣEX¯X¯πX¯πX¯ = Σ
E
X¯X¯
πX¯πX¯
[
−
(
πX − π

X
)
πY πY 
[(
πEX − π
E
X
)
ΣXX
+
(
πEX − π
E
X
)
ΣXX
] /
ΣX¯X¯πX¯πX¯
]
,
ΣEY Y πY πY  =
ΣE
X¯X¯
πX¯πX¯(
πX − π

X
)
Γ E
;
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(ii) for ZE =  −
(
πX − π

X
)
πY πY 
(
πEX Σ

XX
+ πEX Σ

XX
)
/ΣX¯X¯πX¯πX¯ < ,
ΣE
X¯X¯
<  < ΣX¯X¯ ;
(iii) for ZE = −
(
πX − π

X
)
πY πY 
(
πEX Σ

XX
+ πEX Σ

XX
)
/ΣX¯X¯πX¯πX¯ > , π

X
>
πX and
(
πX − π

X
)
+
(
πEX − π
E
X
)
ΣXX +
(
πEX − π
E
X
)
ΣXX < , one obtains
ΣE
X¯X¯
> ΣX¯X¯ >  > Σ
E
Y Y  .
Proof : Vide Appendix V.6. △
The probably most puzzling result of Lemma 5 formulates as the opposite implications of
the focus on an E.P.P.F. on the resulting values of ΣE
X¯X¯
and ΣEY Y  in Lemma 5(iii). The
analysis will now aimed at examining the role of the properties listed through Proposition 1
and Lemmas 2-5 in the assessment of the uniqueness issue.
IV – An Asymmetric Role for Substitutability in
the Emergence of Indeterminacies
IV.1 – The Global Indeterminacy Issue
Pursuing the analysis of the competitive equilibrium with externalities, under the previous
set of assumptions, the system () expresses as [X,t+ λt+ ]′ = Φ
(
X,t, λt
)
when (a) has
been used for restating Y t in terms of X,t and λt+. Letting
(
πX¯
)E
:=
(
∂T/∂X
)E
/
[
T E −(
∂T/∂Y )EY 
]
and
(
πY 
)E
:= −
(
∂T/∂Y 
)E
/
[
T E −
(
∂T/∂Y )EY 
]
, a benchmark definition
is in order:
Definition 3 [Interior Steady State]. Under Assumptions T.1-6, E.1-3, P.1, assume that
there exists a symmetric competitive equilibrium with externalities. An interior steady
state is then a pair
{
Y ⋆, X⋆
}
∈
(
R
∗
+
) that solves:
Y ,⋆/X = ηX
⋆
/X,(
πX¯
)E (
Y ⋆/X; ,X
⋆
/X
)
/
(
πY 
)E (
Y ⋆/X; ,X
⋆
/X
)
=
[
− δ(− η)
]
/δη.
Its existence and uniqueness properties are assessed in the following statement:
Proposition 2 [Existence and Uniqueness/Multiplicity of the Steady States]. Under
Assumptions P.1, T.1-6, E.1-3:
(i) if limX/X→
(
πX¯
)E
/
(
πY 
)E
< [ − δ( − η)]/δη < limX/X→∞
(
πX¯
)E
/
(
πY 
)E
or
limX/X→∞
(
πX¯
)E
/
(
πY 
)E
< [ − δ( − η)]/δη < limX/X→
(
πX¯
)E
/
(
πY 
)E
, there
exists a steady state ;
(ii) if  − πX − π
E
X
ΣXX − π
E
X
ΣXX <  (large spillovers in sector  or high factors
substitutability in the production technologies) or −πX −π
E
X
ΣXX −π
E
X
ΣXX > 
(small spillovers in sector  or complementary factors in the production technologies)
uniformly holds over the set of steady states, then there exists at most one unique steady
state ;
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(iii) if limX/X→
(
πX¯
)E
/
(
πY 
)E
< (>)[−δ(−η)]/δη and limX/X→∞
(
πX¯
)E
/
(
πY 
)E
<
(>)[ − δ( − η)]/δη while there exists a unique solution to  − πX − π
E
X
ΣXX −
πEX Σ

XX
= , then the curve that depicts the set of steady states is single-peaked
(single-caved) and there exists at most two interior steady states.
Proof : Vide Appendix V.7 △
Interestingly, the multiplicity issue, i.e., the sign of −πX−π
E
X
ΣXX−π
E
X
ΣXX , appears
as being unrelated to the prevailing sectoral configuration: while local indeterminacy will reveal
in Proposition 3 as being univocally associated to the occurrence of — the one associated to
optimal cyclic or chaotic sequences in a convex environment — πX > πX , the local uniqueness
of the steady state cannot be discarded in the benchmark well-behaved configuration of optimal
growth theory for which πX > πX .
According to the smoothing properties traditionnally associated with factors substitutability,
the uttermost surprising dimension of Proposition 2 however probably results from the
paradoxical role of its sectoral values in the global indeterminacy issue. If intersectoral
spillovers indeed happen to predominate (are negligible) while intrasectoral ones are negligible
(predominate), a large value for the elasticity of substitution in the production of the
consumption (investment) good will favor multiplicity or give rise to a new type of uniqueness
result for which limX/X→
(
πX¯
)E
/
(
πY 
)E
< [−(−η)]/δη < limX/X→∞
(
πX¯
)E
/
(
πY 
)E
but not boil down the examination of the uniqueness issue to the benchmark configuration for
which πEX = π
E
X
= . In opposition to this, low values for the elasticity of substitution of
both sectors will unambiguously restore the uniqueness result.
These conclusions are in some respects close to a recent examination by Cazzavillan, Lloyd-
Braga and Pintus [14]. Actually, the coefficient − πX − π
E
X
ΣXX − π
E
X
ΣXX is in some
regards reminiscent of the expression that they put forth within an aggregate environment
with spillovers and increasing returns to scale: they indeed, among others, discuss the sign
of  − πX¯ − πEXΣX¯X¯ where the factor share, here its sectoral definition available as
 − πX , is similarly augmented by the spillover share in production technology weighted
by the aggregate elasticity of substitution between the two inputs. In that perspective, the
current line of argument enriches their approach by sectoral concerns: though the present
coefficient primarily relates to the capital good industry , the existence of intersectoral
spillovers effects stemming from the consumption good industry , i.e., πEX > , implies
that the substitutability properties of this latter sector will influence, through ΣXX , the
determination of its sign and thus the case for multiplicity: by itself, letting πEX →  is not
any longer sufficient to ensure the uniqueness of the steady state. Further, their multiplicity
conclusions are associated with an increasing returns to scale assumption on the production
technology: in opposition to this, the current line of argument is entirely based upon a standard
constant returns to scale assumption, be it on both production technologies and thus on the
P.P.F or on the E.P.P.F. Finally, the look for an articulation with the insights of Lemmas 4 and
5 about the potential for atypical global properties of the E.P.P.F. unfortunately appears as
being quite disappointing. As a matter of fact, this easily finds its explanation in the preceding
comment: the uniqueness issue is fundamentally disconnected from intersectoral comparisons
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between factors shares while it is the latters that directly underlie the scopes for both a convex
T E (·; ·, ·, ·) and atypical conclusions on aggregate substitution mechanisms that are gathered
in the equilibrium values of ΣE
X¯X¯
and ΣEY Y  .
Interestingly, by specialising the theoretical argument to parametric formulations, a clarified
picture of the multiplicity issue becomes available:
Corollary 1 [The Multiplicity Issue under a C.E.S. Parameterisation]. Under Assump-
tions P.1, T.1-6, E.1-3, further let the sectoral elasticities of substitution ΣjXX , j = , ,
assume constant values,
(i) if any of the functions Gjj′(·, ·), j, j′ = , , of Assumptions E.1-3 further embraces a
unitary elasticity with respect to its argument XEj/X
E
j , then, under the qualifications of
Proposition 2(iii)-(iv):
a/ if ΣXX = , but to a limit case, there generically exists at most one unique steady
state ;
b/ if ΣXX >  (< ), the set of steady states is a single-peaked (resp. single-caved)
curve and there exists two steady states that coincide when − πX − π
E
X
ΣXX −
πEX Σ

XX
=  holds at a steady state ;
(ii) if any of the functions Gjj′(·, ·) j, j′ = , , of Assumptions E.1-3 originating from sector
j embraces the elasticity of substitution of that sector, i.e., ΣjXX then, further letting
ΣXX =  , under the qualifications of Proposition 2(iii):
a/ if ΣXX = , but to a limit case, there generically exists at most one unique steady
state ;
b/ if ΣXX >  (< ), the set of steady states is a single-peaked (resp. single-caved)
curve and there exists two steady states that coincide when − πX − π
E
X
ΣXX −
πEX =  holds at a steady state.
Proof : Vide Appendix V.8. △
The insights of Corollary 1 are twofold. First, the long-run productivity of the capital stock
is defined from the marginal productivity of the capital good industry from (i) and along
the conclusions of Cazzavillan, Pintus & Lloyd-Braga [14] in an environment with increasing
returns to scale, the uniqueness associated with the Cobb-Douglas representation appears
as a non-robust configuration that disappears as soon as the fixed elasticity of the capital
good industry slightly departs from unitary values. In opposition to this, the insights of (ii)
appear as a direct outcome of the existence of intersectoral spillover effects stemming from
the consumption good industry ; even when the elasticity of substitution of the capital good
industry is stocked to a unitary value, it suffices that spillover effects do not proceed from a
power function for non-unitary values for the elasticity of substitution of the consumption good
industry to directly underlie the existence of multiple steady states whatever the prevailing
sectoral configuration.
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IV.2 – The Local Indeterminacy Issue
Letting the intertemporal elasticity of substitution embrace an infinite value, i.e., for Σc: =
−[∂v(c)/∂c]/
[
∂v(c)/∂c
]
c→∞, further assuming that no factor intensity reversal occurs at
the steady states positions, i.e., equivalently, πX 6= πX over the set of steady states, it is
shown in Appendix V.7 that the Jacobian matrix considered in a neighbourhood of the steady
state then assumes a triangular structure, its spectrum being described by:
ν =
δ(− η)ΞEY Y  − η[− δ(− η)]Ξ
E
Y X
δΞEY Y 
(a)
=
δ(− η)
(
πX − π

X
)
+ [− δ(− η)]
(
− πX
)
πX − π

X

δ
=
(
πX − π

X
)
+ [− δ(− η)]
(
− πX
)
πX − π

X

δ
,
ν =
ΞEY Y 
δ(− η)ΞEY Y  − [− δ(− η)]Ξ
E
XY 
(b)
=
Γ E
δ(− η)Γ E + [− δ(− η)]
(
− πX − π
E
X
ΣXX − π
E
X
ΣXX
)
=
Γ E
Γ E + [− δ(− η)]
(
− πX − π
E
X
ΣXX − π
E
X
ΣXX
) ·
In contradiction with an optimal growth environment and the associated P.P.F., the consid-
eration of an E.P.P.F. — that differs from the standard one as a result of the consideration
of an externalities augmented production set — reintroduces an explicit first-order role for
substitution mechanisms in the stability issue. It is worthwhile noticing that this happens in
spite of the retainment of Σc →∞ on the preferences side: this latter assumption however still
implies that ΣX¯X¯ is erased from the expression of the eigenvalues while it appeared in MΞ .
More precisely, the influence of the external effects which take place in a given sector in the
determination of the equilibrium relative sectoral profit shares index Γ E will be proportionate
to the elasticity of substitution between the inputs of the sector from which they originate. As
an illustration, if ΣXX was made arbitrarily large, the sign of Γ E would be directly ruled by
the one of πEX − π
E
X
independently of the private sign of πX − πX or of the spillovers that
stem from sector , i.e., πEX − π
E
X
.
At that stage, it is also worth remarking that, while the first stocks eigenvalue is let unmodified
by the consideration of a competitive equilibrium with externalities in place of a convex envi-
ronment, the expression of the second prices one undergoes a twofold modification. First, and
as this was already mentionned in the discussion of the multiplicity issue, though the coefficient
 − πX − π
E
X
ΣXX − π
E
X
ΣXX corresponds to a formulation that is largely reminiscent
of an expression put forth in the aggregate environment of Cazzavillan, Lloyd-Braga and Pin-
tus [14], the existence of intersectoral spillovers effects stemming from the consumption good
industry  underlies a fundamentally distinct interpretation. In parallel to this, the second
ingredient that underlies the construction of ν is specific to the current two-goods structure
and states as Γ E : =
(
πX − π

X
)
+
(
πEX − π
E
X
)
ΣXX +
(
πEX − π
E
X
)
ΣXX . The current
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intrasectoral vs intersectoral spillovers and sectoral factors substitutability augmented relative
profit shares coefficient is hence the first to stress in an explicit manner the need for asymme-
tries between intrasectoral and intersectoral spillovers stemming from a given industry in the
stability of a given long-run equilibrium — if the equilibrium intrasectoral and intersectoral
spillovers stemming from a given sector happen to be identical, then Γ E recovers its canonical
expression and no role is any longer allowed for sectoral factors substitutability — but also to
emphasise the central role of heterogeneity in sectoral factors substitutability in that perspec-
tive. The area for local indeterminacies is more carefully circumscribed through the following
statement:
Proposition 3 [The Benchmark Saddlepoint Property & the Areas for Local Indeter-
minacy]. Under assumptions P.1, T.1-6, E.1-3, consider an interior steady state position
along Definition 3 . Then:
(i) if πX > πX , it cannot be locally indeterminate and is characterised by a unique
convergent trajectory if and only if one of the two following conditions is satisfied:
a/
(
− πX − π
E
X
ΣXX − π
E
X
ΣXX
)
Γ E > ;
b/ if
(
−πX −π
E
X
ΣXX − π
E
X
ΣXX
)
Γ E <  when the following inequality further
holds:∣∣Γ E ∣∣ < [− δ(− η)]∣∣(− πX − πEX ΣXX − πEX ΣXX)∣∣/.
(ii) if πX > πX , further let
∣∣πX − πX ∣∣(+ /δ) > [/δ − (− η)](− πX):
a/ if
(
− πX − π
E
X
ΣXX − π
E
X
ΣXX
)
Γ E > , the steady state is locally indetermi-
nate;
b/ if
(
 − πX − π
E
X
ΣXX − π
E
X
ΣXX
)
Γ E < , the steady state is locally
indeterminate if and only if the following inequality further holds:∣∣Γ E ∣∣ < [− δ(− η)]∣∣(− πX − πEX ΣXX − πEX ΣXX)∣∣/.
Proof : Vide Appendix V.9. △
Proposition 3 first clarifies the conditions under which a given steady state exhibits the
saddlepoint property: unsurprisingly, under the holding of the standard assumption according
to which the investment industry uses relatively more capital units than the consumption
one, namely πX > πX , the conditions for the obtention of a locally unique steady state
are more stringent. While these are trivially satisfied in an optimal accumulation since the(
− πX
)(
πX − π

X
)
>  is embedded in Proposition 3(i)a/, the formal condition delivered
by this one allows for the simultaneous holding of −πX −π
E
X
ΣXX − π
E
X
ΣXX <  and
Γ E < , that both entail strongly atypical dimensionsz of the competitive equilibrium with
externalities. Paradoxically enough, the slightly more conventional configuration described
through Proposition 3(i)a/ reveals as being much more difficult with local uniqueness. From
a broader perspective, a first implication of the joint contemplation of Propositions 2 and
3 lies in the erasure of any indeterminacy area when both production technologies tend to
complementarity, i.e., ΣjXX → , j = , : there indeed then exists at most one unique locally
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determinate steady state. Proposition 3(i)-(ii) also makes clear that a necessary condition
for local indeterminacy states as a private configuration where the share of profits in the
consumption good industry is greater than its counterpart in the capital good industry.
Otherwise stated and from Proposition 2, though an equilibrium configuration such that
πX > π

X
can be characterised by an alternance of locally unstable and saddlepoint steady
states, no local indeterminacy is any longer conceivable.
From Proposition 3(ii), it reveals that a relative sectoral profits shares reversal between
the private and the equilibrium level, i.e., the simulaneous occurrence of πX − πX < 
and Γ E : =
(
πX − π

X
)
+
(
πEX − π
E
X
)
ΣXX +
(
πEX − π
E
X
)
ΣXX >  — equivalently
and from Lemma 3(i), the equilibrium production of the capital good industry becomes a
decreasing function of the relative price of the capital good —, plays a role in the emergence
of local indeterminacies. While it may then seem at first sight somewhat difficult to infer a
clear-cut articulation between sectoral factors substitutability, only part of the ingredients of
Corollary 2 are of true interest: the outstanding ones uncover a very specific construction of
insufficient generality to deserve a careful analysis. To perceive this, consider the continuous
time counterpart of the current environment with an unchanged set of of assumptions on
the technology : letting δ ∈ R+ and ρ ∈ R+ respectively denote the depreciation rates of
the capital stock and the rate of time preference of the representative consumer, the local
properties of dynamical equilibria around a steady state are then described, for Σc →∞ and
from Proposition 1, by the following eigenvalues:
ν = −
[
ΞEY X
ΞEY Y 
+
δ
δ + ρ
]
(δ + ρ)
=
[
− πX
πX − π

X
−
δ
δ + ρ
]
(δ + ρ),
ν =
[
ΞEXY 
ΞEY Y 
+ 
]
(δ + ρ)
=
[
−
− πX − π
E
X
ΣXX − π
E
X
ΣXX(
πX − π

X
)
+
(
πEX − π
E
X
)
ΣXX +
(
πEX − π
E
X
)
ΣXX
]
(δ + ρ).
From this, it is straightforward that, in accordance with Proposition 3(i), the simple holding
of πX > πX would ensure that ν <  and thus provide a necessary condition for local
indeterminacy ; a sufficient condition would then be univocally associated with
(
 − πX −
πEX Σ

XX
− πEX Σ

XX
)
Γ E > , that corresponds to Proposition 3(ii)a/: otherwise stated,
such a conjunction is at the core of the indeterminacy conclusions based upon the technological
set described by Assumptions T.1-6, E.1-3. In opposition to this, Proposition 3(ii)b/ is specific
to the discrete time formulation: indeterminacy statements then happen to be directly related
to the depreciation rate of the capital stock. For the current purpose, those solutions seem
of too poor a generality to complete a generic understanding of the role of asymmetries in
factors substitutability and thus deserve a more advanced characterisation. The subsequent
The appraisal of this limit configuration is available upon request.
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statement then gives a more accurate picture of the substitutability underpinnings of local
indeterminacy in the benchmark configuration of Proposition 3(ii)a/.
Proposition 4. [Asymmetric Factors Substitutability, Intra vs Inter–Sectoral Spil-
lovers & Local Indeterminacies] Under assumptions P.1, T.1-6, E.1-3, consider an
interior steady state such that πX−π

X
< ,
∣∣πX−πX ∣∣(+/δ) > [/δ−(−η)](−πX)
and further assume that
(i) intersectoral spillovers are predominant and intrasectoral spillover effects are negligible;
the steady state will become indeterminate if the equilibrium values of ΣXX and Σ

XX
respectively satisfy:
a/ when Γ E > , ΣXX <
[(
πX − π

X
)
+ πEX Σ

XX
]
/πEX and
(
πX − π

X
)
/πEX < Σ

XX
<
(
− πX
)
/πEX ;
b/ when Γ E < , ΣXX >
[(
πX − π

X
)
+ πEX Σ

XX
]
/πEX and Σ

XX
>(
− πX
)
/πEX ;
(ii) intrasectoral spillovers are predominant and intersectoral spillover effects are negligible;
the steady state will become indeterminate if the equilibrium values of ΣXX and Σ

XX
respectively satisfy:
a/ when Γ E > , ΣXX <
[(
πX − π

X
)
+ πEX Σ

XX
]
/πEX and
(
πX − π

X
)
/πEX < Σ

XX
<
(
− πX
)
/πEX ;
b/ when Γ E < , ΣXX >
[(
πX − π

X
)
+ πEX Σ

XX
]
/πEX and Σ

XX
>
(
 −
πX
)
/πEX .
Proof : Vide Appendix V.9. △
The main insights of Proposition 4 may then be listed as follows. First and from Proposition
4(i), it is clear that for dominating intersectoral spillover effects, the substitutability properties
of the capital good industry will be at the core of the area for local indeterminacy. When it
happens to be associated with a relative profit shares reversal between the private and the
equilibrium level, i.e., Γ E >  — the relative cost of the capital input becomes an increasing
function of the relative price of the capital good while the production of the capital output
is a decreasing function of the capital stock, and the equilibrium production of the capital
good decreases as a function of its relative price, arbitrarily low orders for the elasticity of
substitution of the capital good industry together with relative low orders for the elasticity
of substitution of the consumption good — the smaller the intersectoral spillovers stemming
from sector  and taking place in that sector, the larger the substitutability measures that are
compatible with local indeterminacy : more than unitary values for the elasticity of substitution
being, e.g., allowed for πEX > −πX . Oppositely and still from Proposition 4(i), large values
for the elastiticity of substitution of the consumption good industry and arbitrarily large
ones for the elasticity of substitution of the capital good one will favour the emergence of
local indeterminacies when the latter obtains under the dominating influence of intersectoral
spillovers but the production of the capital good remains an increasing function of its price.
Under a configuration closer to the earlier concerns of the literature and from Proposition 4(ii),
i.e., under dominating intrasectoral spillover effects, it is now the substitutability properties
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of the consumption industry which will be central to the potential for local indeterminacy:
while a relative sectoral profit shares reversal will still be associated with low orders for that
value, a configuration where an increasing relation is maintained between the production of
the capital good and its relative price will allow, as soon as intrasectoral spillovers in that
sector are relatively small, for the emergence of local indeterminacy based upon high orders
for the elasticity of substitution in the consumption good industry.
Remark 4: The sole earlier available argument to provide a detailed account of indeter-
minacy stemming from intersectoral spillover effects and which was straightly anchored
on parametric forms is due to Nishimura & Venditti [20, 21] who focus on formulations
F 
(
X, X;X
E
, X
E

)
=
(
X
)α(
X
)α[
θXE+(−θ)X
E

]a, θ ∈ [, ], α+α+a = 
and F 
(
X, X
)
=
(
X
)α(
X
)α , α + α = . The specificity of such a range of as-
sumptions with respect to the present one arises from the case of aggregate capital stock
externalities θ = / which cannot be embedded into the current framework. The current
argument departs from theirs from a constant returns to scale assumption at the private level
and unrestricted formulations for the production technologies, but also the price-related nature
of spillover effects. In that latter respect, a formulation whose properties would more closely
mimic theirs is the specification F j
(
Xj , Xj
)
Hj
(
XE , X
E

)
sketched through Remark 1. ♦
Remark 5: The formulation () for the production technologies is somewhat specific in pos-
tulating a multiplicative separability property between the intrasectoral and the intersectoral
external blocks in the production technologies. Though it could be modified to a formulation
F j
(
Xj , Xj
)
Gj
(
XEj/X
E
j , X
E
j′/X
E
j′
)
where Gj(·, ·) would, e.g., assumed a C.E.S. shape, this
would let essentially unaffected the current argument. A more stimulating extension would
build from a specification F j
(
Xj , Xj ;X
E
j/X
E
j , X
E
j′/X
E
j′
)
when ΣjXX 6= : at the equi-
librium, substitution mechanisms between the private inputs would be directly affected by
spillovers and in which regards this could relax the conditions for indeterminacies is unclear
at that stage. ♦
An eventual class of wonderings pertains to the articulation of these multiplicity results with
the potentially unusual features of the E.P.P.F. described through Lemmas 4 and 5. As for the
scope for a convex E.P.P.F., Proposition 3(ii)a/ is unambiguous since it clearly assesses that
the occurrence of
(
 − πX − π
E
X
ΣXX − π
E
X
ΣXX
)
Γ E > , that underlies the details of
Proposition 4, cannot be reconciled with the satisfaction of Lemma 4(ii) when πX > πX . In
opposition to this, the consideration of Lemma 5 and of the associated modified definition
of substitutability mechanisms that underlie the introduction of an E.P.P.F. uncovers an
interesting articulation:
Corollary 2 [An-E.P.P.F. Understanding of the Multiplicity Results]. Under Assump-
tions P.1, T.1-6, E.1-3, consider an interior steady state, then it is locally indetermi-
nate if πX > π

X
,
∣∣πX − πX ∣∣( + /δ) > [/δ − ( − η)]( − πX), ΣEY Y  <  and
Though the consideration of Proposition 3(ii)b/ would deliver more conclusive results in this perspective,
it has been argued above as being non-generic and thus not well-suited for the generality which has been
sought throughout this contribution.
. . . 27
Equilibrium Production Possibility Frontiers
− πX − π
E
X
ΣXX − π
E
X
ΣXX < .
Proof : Follows from the consideration of Proposition 3(ii)a/ and Lemma 5(iii). △
Otherwise stated, it is the potential for complementary outputs and the increased role factors
substitutability that derive from ΣEY Y  <  and ΣEX¯X¯ > ΣX¯X¯ that lies at the very core of
the scope for local multiplicities.
Sections II, III and IV having been strongly concerned with methodological issues and the
interest of an E.P.P.F. approach, the subsequent section will finally be aimed at examplifying
its potential interest for the appraisal of suboptimal heterogeneous goods environments under
alternative ranges of assumptions on technology and preferences.
V – A Comparison with Related Literature
& Some Extensions
V.1 – Appraising an Alternative Conception of Spillover Effects through an E.P.P.F.
Approach: the 〈〈Sector-Specific 〉〉 Assumption
A generalised — unrestricted — formulation of the class of externalities augmented Cobb-
Douglas production technologies introduced by Benhabib & Nishimura [10] and then gen-
eralised to a n goods argument, an unbounded growth environment and to discrete time
formulations by respectively Benhabib & Nishimura [11], Benhabib, Meng & Nishimura [7]
and Benhabib, Nishimura & Venditti [12], Nishimura & Venditti [29, 30] and surveyed by
Nishimura & Venditti [31, 32], arises from consumption and investment good sectors which
would respectively satisfy:
Y t ≤ F

(
X,t, X,t;X
E
,t, X
E
,t
)
,(a)
Y t ≤ F

(
X,t, X,t;X
E
,t, X
E
,t
)
,(b)
where F (·, ·;XE,t, XE,t
)
and F (·, ·;XE,t, XE,t
)
are supposed to fit Assumptions T.1-6 but
the fact that they are now both assumed to be such that their associated scale elasticities
satisfy:
S
j =
[(
∂F j/∂Xj
)
Xj +
(
∂F j/∂Xj
)
Xj
]
/F j < .
The consideration of a competitive equilibrium with externalities will however modify this
decreasing returns to scale property that will turn into a constant returns one at the equilibrium
level, namely and for S j,E that features, along the E.P.P.F. range of ideas, the scale elasticity
along a competitive equilibrium with externalities:
S
j,E =
[(
∂F j/∂Xj
)
Xj +
(
∂F j/∂Xj
)
Xj +
(
∂F j/∂XEj
)
XEj
+
(
∂F j/∂XEj
)
XEj
]
/F j = .
Otherwise stated, it has systematically been assumed by these authors that πjX + π
j
X
< 
while πjX+π
j
X
+πEXj +π
E
Xj
= , decreasing returns assumptions being retained at the private
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level whereas constant returns to scale were assumed to prevail at the level of the competitive
equilibrium with externalities. As this already appears in the expression above, external effects
in the production set also univocally stem from the specific sector where they appear and this
proceeds in the following way:
Assumption E.4: ∀
(
XEj , X
E
j
)
∈ R∗+ × R
∗
+, ∂F j/∂XEj
j
> , ∂F j/∂XEj
j
> , j = , .
A major difficulty emerges in the perspective of reconducing the gradual formulation of the
E.P.P.F. which was completed in sections II, III and through the introduction of T
(
·; ·, ·; Et
)
, the
matrix MΞ , Lemmas 1-2 and Proposition 1: under Assumption E.4 and for unitary equilibrium
scale elasticities, T
(
·; ·, ·; Et
)
exhibits decreasing
returns to scale. Such a configuration implies, among other complicated features, that the
elasticities Hessian matrix MΞ is of rank three, a one-to-one articulation between costs and
prices and the entailed Stolper-Samuelson theorem being no longer available.
In order to remedy to those difficulties, an alternative — less satisfactory on a theoretical
basis — approach will proceed from replacing the integrated view of the P.P.F. and the
E.P.P.F. by a sole focus on the properties of the E.P.P.F. Letting again ΣjXX feature the
sectoral elasticity of substitution between Xj and Xj in sector j and, building on their
formally related formulations, ΣE
XjXEj
: =
(
∂F j/∂Xj
)(
∂F j/∂XEj
) / (
∂F j/∂Xj∂X
E
j
)
F j
and ΣE
XjXEj
: =
(
∂F j/∂Xj
)(
∂F j/∂XEj
) / (
∂F j/∂Xj∂X
E
j
)
F j denote related substitution-
like external coefficients, the following symmetry assumption will be essential to the possibility
of reaching clear-cut conclusions on the second-order features of the E.P.P.F. with sector-
specific externalities:
Assumption E.5: Production technologies are C.E.S.: ΣjXX = ΣEXjXEj = Σ
E
XjXEj
, j = , .
Considering a competitive equilibrium with externalities defined under Assumptions P.1, E.4-5
and C.E.S. production technologies, it can be shown that, for
ZE := ΣX¯X¯πX¯πX¯
+
[(
πXπY /πX¯
)
πEX +
(
πXπX¯/π

XπX¯
)(
πXπY /πX¯
)
πEX
]
ΣXX
+
[(
πXπY /πX¯
)
πEX +
(
πXπX¯/π

XπX¯
)(
πXπY /πX¯
)
πEX
]
ΣXX ,
Γ E : =
(
πX + π
E
X
)(
πX + π
E
X
)
−
(
πX + π
E
X
)(
πX + π
E
X
)
=
(
πX + π
E
X
)
−
(
πX + π
E
X
)
,
These expressions do not anymore satisfy the symmetry dimension associated with the canonical
definition of the elasticities of substitution.
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the matrix of the weighted second-order elasticities of the E.P.P.F. in turn states as:
[
MΞE
]
=


−
πX + π
E
X
Γ E
− πX − π
E
X
Γ E

[
−
(
πXπ

X
− πXπ

X
)
Γ E
πX¯πX¯ΣX¯X¯Z
E
]
×
[
 −
πX
πXπ

X
− πXπ

X
− πX
πXπ

X
− πXπ

X
]
.
Facing with the scope for a convex E.P.P.F., it derives that ΞEY Y  >  for πXπX−πXπX <
 and
(
πX + π
E
X
)(
πX + π
E
X
)
−
(
πX + π
E
X
)(
πX + π
E
X
)
>  since ZE >  but that
ΞEXX <  and ΞEXX <  are to continue to hold since  − πX − π
E
X
= πX + π
E
X
> .
A convex E.P.P.F. would then obtain for ΞEY Y  + ΞEXX + ΞEXX >  but the underlying
conditions are more stringent than for the current argument. Also and along the range of ideas
of Section III, the competitive equilibrium with externalities trade-offs between the inputs and
the outputs are now described by
ΣEX¯X¯ = ΣX¯X¯
+
[(
πXπY /πX¯
)
πEX +
(
πXπX¯/π

XπX¯
)(
πXπY /πX¯
)
πEX
]
ΣXX
+
[(
πXπY /πX¯
)
πEX +
(
πXπX¯/π

XπX¯
)(
πXπY /πX¯
)
πEX
]
ΣXX ,
ΣEY Y  =
ΣE
X¯X¯
πX¯πX¯(
πX − π

X
)[(
πX + π
E
X
)
−
(
πX + π
E
X
)] ,
a configuration with ΣEY Y  <  and ΣEX¯X¯ > ΣX¯X¯ being again available for π

X
πX −
πXπ

X
<  and
(
πX + π
E
X
)(
πX + π
E
X
)
−
(
πX + π
E
X
)(
πX + π
E
X
)
> .
Facing then with the area for multiplicities and from a straightforward adaptation of the line
of reasoning developed for the proof of Proposition 1, it reveals that the treatment of the
existence/uniqueness issue is significantly simplified with respect to the one of the present
contribution since, for limX/X→
(
πX¯
)E
/
(
πY 
)E
> /δ − ( − η) > limX/X→∞
(
πX¯
)E
/
(
πY 
)E , there exists a steady state that is unique.
Following the approach of Proposition 3 and adaptating the expressions of the system () to
the contents of Proposition 5, it is readily proved that when such an E.P.P.F. is considered in
the neighbourhood of a steady state and Σc →∞ is further assumed, the explicit formulation
of the eigenvalues is available as:
ν =
δ(− η)
(
πXπ

X
− πXπ

X
)
+ [− δ(− η)]πX
πXπ

X
− πXπ

X

δ
,(a)
ν =
(
πX + π
E
X
)
−
(
πX + π
E
X
)
δ(− η)
[(
πX + π
E
X
)
−
(
πX + π
E
X
)]
+ [− δ(− η)]
(
− πX − π
E
X
) ·(b)
The area for local indeterminacies and the role of factors substitutability in that perspective
are then delimited by first noticing that, for πX/πX > πX/πX , the steady state cannot be
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locally indeterminate. In opposition to this and for πX/πX > πX/πX , further let η = , a
sufficient condition for local indeterminacy boils down to the holding of πX/πX−πX/πX <
 and
(
πX + π
E
X
)
/
(
πX + π
E
X
)
−
(
πX + π
E
X
)
/
(
πX + π
E
X
)
> .
Some limitations to the actual revelance of such a result however emerge:
– First, the above insights directly result from the retainment of S j <  and S j,E = ,
j = ,  that, when combined with Assumption E.8, implies decreasing returns to scale at the
private level. Such microfoundations may not be entirely acceptable as the departure from
constant returns to scale at the private level entails the existence of profits which are not
explicitly taken into account in the analysis. Notwithstanding such general concerns about the
actual micro-foundations of such a conjunction on returns to scale, it may be observed that the
approach clearly rests upon a departure from a standard constant returns to scale hypothesis at
the private level — and thus an atypical configuration — in order to raise irregular conclusions
at the equilibrium level, that limits, at least a first sight, their actual interest.
– As soon as any plausible intersectoral dimension for external effects is considered
together with an Assumption such as E.4, be it with or without E.5, any possibility of a
clear-cut argument resting upon factors intensities in the spirit of Propositions 1–3 definitively
becomes out of order.
– Perhaps more fundamentally , any first-order role is erased for sectoral substitutability
in the determinacy issue, i.e., and as established in [15, 18], exactly the same unappealing
features as a convex bi-sectoral optimal growth environment. But this is an artificial and direct
outcome of Assumption E.5 — this boils down to assume, along the recent contributions of
Nishimura & Venditti [25, 26] and their surveys [27, 28], C.E.S. parametric formulations for
the two sectoral production technologies, ΣjXX , j = ,  being thus a constant — that would
not generalise to an arbitrary theoretical production technology under the 〈〈sectors-specific 〉〉
assumption E.4.
V.2 – Allowing for Non-Linear Utilities
V.2.1 – A Stationary Environment
While the preceding statements enlighten, through Propositions 2, 3 and 4, the role of
the heterogeneous measures of factors substitutability, namely ΣXX and ΣXX , in the
determinacy properties of a competitive economy, they make no explicit account of the role
of aggregate factors substitutability, i.e., ΣX¯X¯ . As previously mentioned, this is a direct
byproduct of the retainment of Σc → ∞ on the intertemporal preferences of the agent. An
undesirable implication of such a limitation results from the direct articulation between this
elasticity of substitution between the aggregate values of the inputs and the elasticity of
substitution between the two outputs ΣY Y  : otherwise stated, by letting Σc →∞, one cannot
directly appraise the role of finite values for the elasticity of substitution between the two
outputs and thus of a nonlinear P.P.F. in the emergence of local indeterminacies. The formal
difficulty in relaxing such an assumption on preferences essentially results from the expression
of the equilibrium first-order derivatives that are concerned with the level component (i) of
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the E.P.P.F. in Definition 2 — letting Σc → ∞ oppositely allowed to specialise the analysis
on the prices component (ii) of the E.P.P.F. in Definition 2. Considering indeed Definition 2(i)
and introducing, along ΞEY Y  through () and from Lemma 1(i), e.g.,
πEX¯ : =
∂T E /∂X
)
X
T E −
(
∂T/∂Y 
)E
Y 
= πX + πXE/XEΞ(X̂/X̂)X
+ πXE/XEΞ(X̂/X̂)X
,
it is immediatly derived, along the constructive approach to Proposition 1 and letting
V E : =
(
πY π
E
X
+ πY π
E
X
)
ΣXX +
(
πY π
E
X
+ πY π
E
X
)
ΣXX , that:
 πEY πEX
πEX
′ =

πY  −
V E
(
πX − π

X
)
ZEΣX¯X¯πX¯πX¯
πX¯ −
V E πX
ZEΣX¯X¯πX¯πX¯
πX¯ +
V E
(
− πX
)
ZEΣX¯X¯πX¯πX¯

′
.
For W (ν) =
(
ν − ν
)(
ν − ν
)
=  the characteristic polynomial of the Jacobian Matrix,
necessary and sufficient conditions for local indeterminacy list as the joint holding of W () < ,
W (−) > , W () > . The first of these conditions is of special interest — it is also
the conceptually simplest one since is merely invoves one coefficient of the characteristic
polynomial,i.e., the product of the eigenvalues — as it corresponds to the breaking of one
of the building blocks of optimal growth theory, i.e., the pair roots structure of the Jacobian
matrix. While its canonical value usually states as /δ, it is readily shown that the condition
W () <  here writes down as:(
η
{
/Σc
πY 
[
πX¯ −
V E
(
− πX
)
ZE πX¯πX¯ΣX¯X¯
]
+
Γ E
(
− πX
)
πX¯
ZE πX¯πX¯ΣX¯X¯
}
+ (− η)
{
/Σc
πY 
[
πY  −
V E
(
πX − π

X
)
ZE πX¯πX¯ΣX¯X¯
]
+
Γ E
(
πX − π

X
)
πX¯
ZE πX¯πX¯ΣX¯X¯
})−
×
(
δη
πX¯
πY 
{
/Σc
πY 
[
πY  −
V E
(
πX − π

X
)
ZE πX¯πX¯ΣX¯X¯
]
+
W E
(
πX − π

X
)
πY 
ZE πX¯πX¯ΣX¯X¯
}
+ δ(− η)
{
/Σc
πY 
[
πY  −
V E
(
πX − π

X
)
ZE πX¯πX¯ΣX¯X¯
]
+
Γ E
(
πX − π

X
)
πX¯
ZE πX¯πX¯ΣX¯X¯
})
< ,
for W E : =  − πX − π
E
X
ΣXX − π
E
X
ΣXX . Otherwise stated, even for one of three coef-
ficients, an integrated view of local indeterminacy that makes explicit account of intertempo-
ral substitutability in consumption, aggregate measures of outputs substitutability, asymmet-
ric sectoral understandings of factors substitutability and intra versus intersectoral spillovers
The details are available upon request.
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sounds unreachable. A much more appropriate environment in that perspective is ought to
build from a two-period overlapping generations setting of the kind considered by Cazzavillan
[13] in an appraisal of an aggregate increasing returns technological set. The simplicity of the
basic understanding of intertemporal preferences inherent to these structures should permit
to circumvent the current difficulties associated with the appraisal of Σc <∞. ♦
V.2.2 – Unbounded Growth
As stressed through the above section, a limit to the insights of Proposition 3 and Corollary
2 stems from the assumption Σc → ∞. An alternative and simpler way of handling finite
values for the intertemporal elasticity of substitution would stem from the characterisation of
unbounded equilibrium growth solutions within a two capital goods environment, one of which
would be a mixed good, say , that can be consumed or accumulated, while the other, say
, is a pure accumulation one. The Production Possibility Frontier would then formulate at
date t ≥  as: Y t = T
(
Y t , Y

t ;X,t, X,t;Et
)
Along the approach of Proposition 1, it is readily
shown that the Hessian elasticities matrix states as
[
MΞEG
]
=



−
πX + π
E
X
ΣXX − π
E
X
ΣXX(
πX − π

X
)
+
(
πEX − π
E
X
)
ΣXX +
(
πEX − π
E
X
)
ΣXX
− πX − π
E
X
ΣXX + π
E
X
ΣXX(
πX − π

X
)
+
(
πEX − π
E
X
)
ΣXX +
(
πEX − π
E
X
)
ΣXX

×
[
−
(
πX − π

X
)
Γ E G
πX¯πX¯ΣX¯X¯Z
E G
] [
  −
πX
πX − π

X
− πX
πX − π

X
]
,
for ZE G a coefficient formally related to ZE in Proposition 1. As this is proved in Drugeon
[17], a block diagonal structure is recovered for the Jacobian Matrix and the local behaviour
around an equilibrium growth ray κ ∈ R∗+ will be governed by a spectrum made of ν = ,
ν = /δκ
−/Σc and
ν =

δκ−/Σc
+
[
− πX
πX − π

X
− 
][
κ/Σ
c
− δ
(
− η
)]
δκ
+
[
πX
πX − π

X
− 
][
κ/Σ
c
− δ
(
− η
)]
δκ
,
ν =
{
+
[
−
δ
(
− η
)
κ/Σc
][
πX + π
E
X
ΣXX + π
E
X
ΣXX
Γ E G
− 
]
+
[
−
δ
(
− η
)
κ/Σc
][
− πX − π
E
X
ΣXX − π
E
X
ΣXX
Γ E G
− 
]}−
,
where /δκ−/Σc > , κ/Σc > δ
(
− η
)
and κ/Σc > δ
(
− η
)
. A detailed characterisation,
noticeably the need for πX > πX in order for indeterminate growth rays to emerge, is
. . . 33
Equilibrium Production Possibility Frontiers
available in Drugeon [17], noticeably in the non-trivial role of the heterogenous depreciation
rates of the capital goods in that perspective. ♦
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VII - Proofs
VII.1 – Proof of Lemma 1.
(i) Two relations between the technological parameters shall extensively be used in the
subsequent argument:
πX/
(
− πX
)
πX/
(
− πX
) = µ/(− µ)
µ/
(
− µ
) ,
− πY 
πY 
=
πX
πX
− µ
µ
=
− πX
− πX
− µ
µ
·
For ǫ: = [   ]′, letting Ωi, Q, Xij and X Ej − X Ej , i, j = , , respectively denote the
differentiated expressions of the rental rate of input i, the relative price of the capital good,
the amount of input i used in sector j and of the ratio XEj/XEj , the system of sectoral
optimality conditions implies :
[
Ω
Ω
]
=

πX
ΣXX
−
πX
ΣXX
(X −X)+ ǫπEX (X E −X E)+ ǫπEX (X E −X E)
[
Ω
Ω
]
− ǫQ =

πX
ΣXX
−
πX
ΣXX
(X −X)+ ǫπEX (X E −X E)+ ǫπEX (X E −X E)
In parallel to this, letting Y j , Xi and Mj , i, j = , , respectively denote the differentiated
expressions of the production of good j, the available amount of input j and the share of input
 used for the production of good j, equilibrium levels of production give:[
Y 
Y 
]
=
[
M
M
]
+ǫX+
πX 
 πX
[X −X
X −X
]
+
πEX πEX
πEX π
E
X
[X E −X E
X E −X
E

]
,
for the differentiated expressions of factors shares that derive from the full employment
equation
(
− µ
)(
X/X
)
+ µ
(
X/X
)
= X/X as:[
M
M
] [
µ −
µµ
µ
]
=
 µµµ µµµ
−µ −µ
[X −X
X −X
]
+
−µµ

 [X −X] .
Hinging upon the relation µij/πY j = πjXi/πX¯i , i, j = , , it is obtained that this reformulates
to: [
M
M
]
=
[
πXπY 
πX¯
(
πX
πX
−
πX
πX
)]−
−π

X
πY 
πXπY 

 [X −X]
+

πXπ

X
πX¯π

X
πXπ

X
πY πY 
πX¯π

X
πY 
−
πXπY 
πX¯
−
πXπY 
πX¯
[X −XX −X
] .
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It is derived that:
[
ǫ
(
Ω −Ω
)
Q
]
=


ΣXX



ΣXX
πX
ΣXX
−
πX
ΣXX

[
X −X
X −X
]
+

 
 
−
(
πEX − π
E
X
)
−
(
πEX − π
E
X
)

[
X E −X
E

X E −X
E

]
,
whence an articulated view between relative costs and prices that is parameterised by the
vector of spillover effects:
Ω −Ω =
[
Q +
(
πEX − π
E
X
)(
X
E
 −X
E

)
+
(
πEX − π
E
X
)(
X
E
 −X
E

)] / (
πX − π

X
)
.
Integrating this relation into the differentiated expressions of Y  and Y , the expressions of
outputs as functions of stocks and prices derive, noticing that:
(
πX − π

X
)
πY πY /πX¯πX¯ =
(
πX/πX¯ − π

X/πX¯
)
πY  ,
as
[
Y 
Y 
]
=

πXπX¯/πY 
πX − π

X
−
πXπX¯/πY 
πX − π

X
−
πXπX¯/πY 
πX − π

X
πXπX¯/πY 
πX − π

X
[XX
]
+
[
B
B
]
Q
+
[
C C
C C
] [
X E −X
E

X E −X
E

]
,
for the components of the vector that relates outputs to prices that are given, integrating the
expression of the elasticity of substitution between the aggregate values of the inputs, by:
B = −
{[
πX +
πXπ

X
πX − π

X
]
ΣXX +
πXπ

X
πX − π

X
πY 
πY 
ΣXX
} / (
πX − π

X
)
= −
πX¯πX¯ΣX¯X¯(
πX − π

X
)
πY 
;
B = −
{
−
πXπ

X
πX − π

X
πY 
πY 
ΣXX +
[
πX −
πXπ

X
πX − π

X
]
ΣXX
} / (
πX − π

X
)
=
πX¯πX¯ΣX¯X¯(
πX − π

X
)
πY 
;
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while the matrix that relates the outputs to the various components of the externalities set
details as:[
C C
C C
]
=
 /πY 
−/πY 
 πX¯πX¯ΣX¯X¯
πX − π

X
[πEX − π
E
X
πEX − π
E
X
]
+
πEX πEX
πEX π
E
X
 .
Rearranging, it is finally obtained that:(
πX − π

X
) [πY  
 πY 
] [
Y 
Y 
]
−
[
πX −π

X
−πX π

X
] [
πX¯ 
 πX¯
] [
X
X
]
=
πX¯πX¯ΣX¯X¯
πX − π

X
[
−

] [
 −
(
πEX − π
E
X
)
−
(
πEX − π
E
X
) ]  QX E −X E
X E −X
E


+
(
πX − π

X
) [πY  
 πY 
] [
πEX π
E
X
πEX π
E
X
] [
X E −X
E

X E −X
E

]
.
Summing over these two equations, it emerges that:
[πY  πY  ]
[
Y 
Y 
]
= [πX¯ πX¯ πY π
E
X
+ πY π
E
X
πY π
E
X
+ πY π
E
X
]
×

X
X
X E −X
E

X E −X
E

 .
The statement follows.
(ii) From a simple rearrangement of the expression of the production of the investment good,
it is obtained that:
Q =
[
πX¯πX¯ΣX¯X¯
πX − π

X
]−[πY 
(
πX − π

X
)
−πXπX¯ π

X
πX¯ ]
Y X
X

+

πX¯πX¯ΣX¯X¯
(
πEX − π
E
X
)
πX − π

X
− πEX πY 
πX¯πX¯ΣX¯X¯
(
πEX − π
E
X
)
πX − π

X
− πEX πY 

′ [
X E −X
E

X E −X
E

] .
Noticing that the system of first-order conditions parallely implies
[
Ω
Ω
]
=

πX
πX − π

X
−
πX
πX − π

X
Q
+

−
πX
(
πEX − π
E
X
)
πX − π

X
+ πEX −
πX
(
πEX − π
E
X
)
πX − π

X
+ πEX
πX
(
πEX − π
E
X
)
πX − π

X
+ πEX
πX
(
πEX − π
E
X
)
πX − π

X
+ πEX

[
X E −X
E

X E −X
E

]
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Rearranging, the expressions of the statement become available. △
(iii) The differentiation of the equations of the statement — that follow from the assumption
of freely shiftable inputs between the two sectors — uncovers the features of Ψ j(·), j = ,  as
respectively:{
πEX + π
E
X
ΣXX
ΣXX
−
πX¯πX¯ΣX¯X¯(
πX − π

X
)
ΣXX
}(
X −X
)
=(
πX¯πX¯ΣX¯X¯
πX − π

X
)
Q
πX − π

X
+

πX¯πX¯ΣX¯X¯
(
πEX − π
E
X
)
πX − π

X
− πEX πY 
πX¯πX¯ΣX¯X¯
(
πEX − π
E
X
)
πX − π

X
− πEX πY 

′ [
X E −X
E

X E −X
E

]
,
and
(
X−X
)
=
(
ΣXX/Σ

XX
)(
X−X
)
, for the expression of Q that was available
from (ii). △
VII.2 – Proof of Lemma 2.
Integrating the definition of the equilibrium, the fixed-point to be solved by the system of
demands expresses as:
−
πX¯πX¯ΣX¯X¯
πX − π

X
{

ΣXX
+
πEX − π
E
X
πX − π

X
+
(
πEX − π
E
X
)
ΣXX(
πX − π

X
)
ΣXX
}(
X −X
)
=
πX¯πX¯ΣX¯X¯
πX − π

X
×
Q
πX − π

X
·
Simplifying:
X −X = −
ΣXXQ(
πX − π

X
)
+
(
πEX − π
E
X
)
ΣXX +
(
πEX − π
E
X
)
ΣXX
and integrating that
(
X −X
)
=
(
ΣXX/Σ

XX
)(
X −X
)
, the statement follows.△
VII.3 – Proof of Lemma 3.
Integrating Lemma 2, it is immediate that the matrix that related the outputs to the various
components of the externalities set in Lemma 1 reformulates as a vector that relates these
outputs to the relative price of the capital good. For Γ E : =
(
πX−π

X
)
+
(
πEX −π
E
X
)
ΣXX+(
πEX − π
E
X
)
ΣXX , the first of its components details as:
−
πX¯πX¯ΣX¯X¯(
πX − π

X
)
πY 
[
−
(
πEX − π
E
X
)
ΣXX +
(
πEX − π
E
X
)
ΣXX
Γ E
]
+ πEX Σ

XX + π
E
X
ΣXX
= −
πX¯πX¯ΣX¯X¯(
πX − π

X
)
Γ E πY 
[
+
(
πEX Σ

XX
+ πEX Σ

XX
)(
πX − π

X
)
πY 
πX¯πX¯ΣX¯X¯
]
.
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Completing the same approach, the coefficient that relates the equilibrium production of the
capital good to its relative price is similarly available as:
πX¯πX¯ΣX¯X¯(
πX − π

X
)
Γ E πY 
[
−
(
πEX Σ

XX
+ πEX Σ

XX
)(
πX − π

X
)
πY 
πX¯πX¯ΣX¯X¯
]
.
Merging and noticing that the matrix that relative equilibrium outputs to stocks is let
unaffected by the consideration of a competitive equilibrium with externalities, the statement
follows. △
VII.4 – Proof of Proposition 1.
Solving between the differentiated expressions of Y  and Y , it derives that:
ΞEY Y  = −
πY 
πX¯πX¯
Γ E
ZE
(
πX − π

X
)
,
ΞEY X = −
πX
πX − π

X
ΞEY Y 
ΞEY X = −
πX
πX − π

X
ΞEY Y  ·
In parallel to this, noticing that[
Ω
Ω
]
=
(
Γ E
)− −(πX + πEX ΣXX + πEX ΣXX)
− πX − π
E
X
ΣXX − π
E
X
ΣXX
Q
and rearranging, the expression of the matrix MΞ becomes available. △
VII.5 – Proof of Lemma 4.
Firstly restating the principal diagonal components of the Hessian Elasticies Matrix:
ΞEY Y  = −
πY 
πX¯πX¯
Γ E
ZE
(
πX − π

X
)
,
ΞEXX = −
πX
(
πX + π
E
X
ΣXX + π
E
X
ΣXX
)
ΣX¯X¯πX¯πX¯
[
−
(
πX − π

X
)
πY 
(
πEX Σ

XX
+ πEX Σ

XX
)
/ΣX¯X¯πX¯πX¯
]
ΞEXX = −
πX
(
− πX − π
E
X
ΣXX − π
E
X
ΣXX
)
ΣX¯X¯πX¯πX¯
[
−
(
πX − π

X
)
πY 
(
πEX Σ

XX
+ πEX Σ

XX
)
/ΣX¯X¯πX¯πX¯
] ·
The scope for ΞEY Y  >  hence happens to be univocally associated with the possible
occurrence of Γ EZE < . Such a conjunction in its turn emerges under two distinct
configurations:
a/ πX > πX , −
(
πX − π

X
)
πY 
ΣX¯X¯πX¯πX¯
(
πEX Σ

XX + π
E
X
ΣXX
)
< , Γ E > ,
b/ ZE > ,
(
πX − π

X
)[(
πX − π

X
)
+
(
πEX − π
E
X
)
ΣXX
+
(
πEX − π
E
X
)
ΣXX
]
< .
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In parallel to this, the occurrence of ΞEXX >  is obtained for
πX > π

X , −
(
πX − π

X
)
πY 
ΣX¯X¯πX¯πX¯
(
πEX Σ

XX + π
E
X
ΣXX
)
< .
Finally, the scope for ΞEXX >  emerges under the occurrence of one of the two following
configurations:
a/ πX > πX , −
(
πX − π

X
)
πY 
ΣX¯X¯πX¯πX¯
(
πEX Σ

XX + π
E
X
ΣXX
)
< ,
− πX − π
E
X
ΣXX − π
E
X
ΣXX > ,
b/ − πX − π
E
X
ΣXX − π
E
X
ΣXX < ,
−
(
πX − π

X
)
πY 
ΣX¯X¯πX¯πX¯
(
πEX Σ

XX + π
E
X
ΣXX
)
> .
1 – To sum up and for ZE < , the simultaneous occurrences of ΞEY Y  > , ΞEXX >  and
ΞEXX >  would be guaranteed when the following inequalities are further satisfied:
(i)
(
πX − π

X
)[(
πX − π

X
)
+
(
πEX − π
E
X
)
ΣXX +
(
πEX − π
E
X
)
ΣXX
]
> ,
(ii) − πX − π
E
X
ΣXX − π
E
X
ΣXX > .
2 – In opposition to this and for ZE > , ΞEXX < , so that a convex E.P.P.F. can
only be obtained under the simultaneous occurrences of ΞEY Y  > , ΞEXX >  and
ΞEY Y  +Ξ
E
XX
+ΞEXX > , namely
(i)
(
πX − π

X
)[(
πX − π

X
)
+
(
πEX − π
E
X
)
ΣXX +
(
πEX − π
E
X
)
ΣXX
]
< ,
(ii) − πX − π
E
X
ΣXX − π
E
X
ΣXX < 
for the two first relations while a sufficient condition for the holding of the third is available
as the satisfaction of ΞEXX +ΞEXX >  that in turn formulates, under ZE > , as:
(iii) πX
(
πX+π
E
X
ΣXX+π
E
X
ΣXX
)
<
(
−πX
)(
−πX−π
E
X
ΣXX−π
E
X
ΣXX
)
.
Items 1 and 2 provide a set of sufficient conditions under which the E.P.P.F. as defined through
Definition 2 from T E (·; ·, ·),
[
∂T (·; ·, ·)/∂Y 
]E , [∂T (·; ·, ·)/∂X]E and [∂T (·; ·, ·)/∂X]E be-
comes a convex equilibrium function. △
VII.6 – Proof of Lemma 5.
The derivation of ΣE
X¯X¯
and ΣEY Y  proceeds from the consideration of:
Y t
Y t
=
FE ,
FE ,
(
,X,t/X, qt
)
,
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that, in differentiated terms, states as:
Y
 − Y  =
(
πX/πY  + π

X
/πY 
)
πX − π

X
πX¯X −
(
πX/πY  + π

X
/πY 
)
πX − π

X
πX¯X
+
πX¯πX¯ΣX¯X¯(
πX − π

X
)
Γ E
[
−
(
/πY  + /πY 
)
+
(
πX − π

X
)[(
πEX − π
E
X
)
ΣXX +
(
πEX − π
E
X
)
ΣXX
]
ΣX¯X¯πX¯πX¯
]
and from the subsequent consideration of the equilibrium coefficient that relates qt to the ratio
ωt /ω

t , namely
(
πX−π

X
)
+
(
πEX −π
E
X
)
ΣXX +
(
πEX −π
E
X
)
ΣXX , that eventually gives
ΣEX¯X¯πX¯πX¯ =
(
πXπ

XπY Σ

XX + π

Xπ

XπY Σ

XX
)
×
[
−
(
πX − π

X
)[(
πEX − π
E
X
)
ΣXX +
(
πEX − π
E
X
)
ΣXX
](
πY πY 
)−
ΣX¯X¯πX¯πX¯
]
,
ΣEY Y πY πY  =
ΣE
X¯X¯
πX¯πX¯(
πX − π

X
)
Γ E
.
An interesting property of the two above expressions states as follows. While it can be shown
that, in a standard convex two-goods world,ΣY Y  > ΣX¯X¯ , this inequality can be reversed in
the course of a competitive equilibrium with externalities. Already refering to a configuration
that shall reveal as being at the core of the subsequent multiplicity argument, one may indeed
notice that, for πX > πX and
(
πX −π

X
)
+
(
πEX −π
E
X
)
ΣXX +
(
πEX −π
E
X
)
ΣXX < ,
one obtains ΣE
X¯X¯
> ΣX¯X¯ >  > Σ
E
Y Y  , namely a configuration where the substituability
between the two aggregate values of the inputs is increased with respect to its standard
formulation while the two outputs end up as being complements in place of substitutes in
the benchmark convex case. △
VII.7 – Proof of Proposition 2.
(i) This directly follows from the definition of the steady state.
(ii)-(iii) The steady state expression of the rate of return on the capital stock reformulates as:(
πX¯
)E (
ηX/X; ,X/X
)(
πY 
)E (
ηX/X; ,X/X
) = [− δ(− η)]/δη.
Letting Υ (·) denote the L.H.S. of this equation and ξΥ/(X/X): = Υ ′ (X/X)× (X/X) /Υ (X/X),
it derives that:
ξΥ/(X/X) =
(
ΞEXY  +Ξ
E
Y Y 
)
πY  +
(
ΞEXX +Ξ
E
Y X
)
πX¯
=
[
−
− πX − π
E
X
ΣXX − π
E
X
ΣXX(
πX − π

X
)
+
(
πEX − π
E
X
)
ΣXX +
(
πEX − π
E
X
)
ΣXX
]
×
(
ΞEY XπX¯ +Ξ
E
Y Y πY 
)
= −
(
− πX − π
E
X
ΣXX − π
E
X
ΣXX
) πY 
πX¯πX¯ΣX¯X¯Z
E
·
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The statement follows. △
VII.8 – Proof of Corollary 1.
(i) In the C.E.S. case and for Cobb-Douglas functions for the spillover effects, i.e., for :
F 
(
X, X
)
=
[(
− αX
)(
X
)−/ΣXX + αX(X)−/ΣXX ]/(−/ΣXX ),
F 
(
X, X
)
=
[(
− αX
)(
X
)−/ΣXX + αX(X)−/ΣXX ]/(−/ΣXX ),
G
(
XE, X
E

)
=
(
XE/X
E

)αE
X , G
(
XE, X
E

)
=
(
XE/X
E

)αE
X ,
G
(
XE, X
E

)
=
(
XE/X
E

)αE
X , G
(
XE, X
E

)
=
(
XE/X
E

)αE
X ,
the definition of the steady state boils down to:
πX
µ
= [− δ(− η)]/δη,
for
πX =
αX
(
X/X
)−/ΣXX(
− αX
)
+ αX
(
X/X
)−/Σ
XX
,
η = µ
(
X/X
)−[(
− αX
)
+ αX
(
X/X
)−/ΣXX ]/(−/ΣXX)
×
(
X/X
)αE
X
(
X/X
)αE
X ,
 =
αX
(
X/X
)−/ΣXX
− αX
−
αX
(
X/X
)−/ΣXX
− αX
·
Integrating the third equation, the second above equation implies the local holding of
M =
[
πX − α
E
X
(
ΣXX/Σ

XX
)
− αEX
](
X −X
)
.
The L.H.S. of the definition of the steady state thus emerges as a function Ψ
(
X/X
)
whose
slope can be computed to:
ξΨ/(X/X) =
(
− /ΣXX
)
πX −
[
πX − α
E
X
(
ΣXX/Σ

XX
)
− αEX
]
= −ΣXX
[
πX
(
X/X
)
− αEX Σ

XX − α
E
X
ΣXX
]
.
For ΣXX 6= , its second-order properties emerge as:
ξ[Ψ/(X/X)]/(X/X) = −
(
− /ΣXX
)
πX .
Considering then a value of X⋆/X⋆ that solves ξΨ/(X/X) =  and thus describes the case
for multiplicity. From the expression of ξΨ/(X/X), it is necessarily unique in the C.E.S. case
and its expression is given by
X⋆/X
⋆
 =
[
αX
αEX Σ

XX
+ αEX Σ

XX
]−(−/ΣXX)
.
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From the expression of ξ[Ψ/(X/X)]/(X/X), it respectively corresponds to a minimum and
a maximum of the function Ψ(·) for ΣXX <  and ΣXX > . The details of the statement
follow.
(ii) In the Cobb-Douglas case for the capital good industry but when a C.E.S. is retained for
the spillover effects stemming from the consumption good industry, i.e.,
G
(
XE, X
E

)
=
[(
− αEX
)
+ αEX
(
XE/X
E

)−/ΣXX ]/(−/ΣXX ),
G
(
XE, X
E

)
=
[(
− αEX
)
+ αEX
(
XE/X
E

)−/ΣXX ]/(−/ΣXX ),
the first and third ingredients of the definition of the steady state respectively simplify to
πX = αX and αX
(
X/X
)−
/
(
−αX
)
= αX
(
X/X
)−/ΣXX /(−αX) while
the second is modified to
η = µ
(
X/X
)αX [(− αEX )+ αEX (X/X)−/(−/ΣXX)]−(−/ΣXX)
×
(
X/X
)αE
X ,
that implies
M =
[
− αX − π
E
X
ΣXX − α
E
X
](
X −X
)
.
The L.H.S. of the definition of the steady state again emerge as a function Ψ
(
X/X
)
whose
slope and second-order properties can be computed to:
ξΨ/(X/X) = −
[
− αX − π
E
X
ΣXX − α
E
X
]
,
ξ[Ψ/(X/X)]/(X/X) = −
(
− /ΣXX
)
πEX .
The argument then follows from the same line of reasoning as the one developed in (i). △
VII.9 – Proof of Propositions 3 and 4.
Under the earlier list of assumptions on preferences and the technology and from an application
of the Implicit Function Theorem in a neighbourhood of the steady state position, for
Σc: = −/ξcc →∞, the elasticities of the demand of Y t as a function of X,t and λt+ can be
computed from (a) as: Y t =
[
∆Y X ∆Y λ′
]
[X,t Λt+ ]
′, for Y t : =
(
Y t − Y
⋆
)
/Y ⋆,
X,t: =
(
X,t −X
⋆

)
/X⋆ , Λt+: =
(
λt+ − λ
⋆
)
/λ⋆ and:
∆Y X = −
[
ΞEY Y πX¯
]−[
ΞEY XπY 
]
,
∆Y λ′ = −
[
ΞEY Y πY 
]−
.
The linearised formulation of the ensued dynamical system defined from (b-c) in a neighbour-
hood of a steady state
{
X⋆ , λ
⋆
}
is then given by:[
X,t+
Λt+
]
=
[ (
∆Y X +∆Y λ′∆λ′X
)
η + (− η)
(
∆Y λ′∆λ′λ
)
η
∆λ′X ∆λ′λ
] [
X,t
Λt
]
,
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the components of the price equation being computed as:
∆λ′X = −
ΞEXXπX¯ −Ξ
E
XY 
πY ∆Y X
[− δ(− η)]−[δ(− η)] +ΞEXY πY ∆Y λ′
,
∆λ′λ =
[− δ(− η)]−
[− δ(− η)]−[δ(− η)] +ΞEXY πY ∆Y λ′
·
Noticing that, taking advantage of Proposition 1, ∆λ′X = , a diagonal structure becomes
available for the Jacobian Matrix. The eigenvalues are real and available in the main text.
(i) First, and as this was to be expected from Proposition 2, the component of the Jacobian
matrix that pertains to the stock equation, i.e., ν, remains unaffected by the consideration of
a suboptimal equilibrium with external effects in place of an optimum. Hence, although the
pair structure of the Jacobian Matrix is unambiguously lost — that ν is an eigenvalue does
not anymore imply that /δν is also an eigenvalue — an equilibrium configuration with a
greater share of profits within the investment good sector, i.e., for which πX > πX prevails,
is associated with ν >  since this latter condition restates as
[/δ − (− η)]
− πX
πX − π

X
> − (− η).
It thus erases any area for local indeterminacies.
a/ Consider, e.g., the scope for the saddlepoint property when Γ E
(
 − πX − π
E
X
ΣXX −
πEX Σ

XX
)
> . As this implies the holding of ν > , the saddlepoint property will then
be available for ν < . For Γ E > , this requires the satisfaction of  − πX − π
E
X
ΣXX −
πEX Σ

XX
>  that holds by assumption. Similarly and for Γ E < , comparison with respect
to  suggests the need for − πX − π
E
X
ΣXX − π
E
X
ΣXX > , that holds by assumption.
b/ In opposition to this and for Γ E
(
−πX−π
E
X
ΣXX−π
E
X
ΣXX
)
< , the requesites for
the holding of the saddlepoint property are slightly more stringent. For ν <  and Γ E > ,
they indeed boil down to the satisfaction of
Γ E < Γ E < −[− δ(− η)]
(
− πX − π
E
X
ΣXX − π
E
X
ΣXX
)
while a related line of reasoning for Γ E <  allows for completing the statement.
(ii) This follows from the expressions of ν and ν: the first condition ensures that ν ∈ ]−, [.
The steady state will then be indeterminate for ν ∈ ]− , [, i.e.
− <
Γ E
Γ E + [− δ(− η)]
(
− πX − π
E
X
ΣXX − π
E
X
ΣXX
) < ,
that restates as:
− < −
[− δ(− η)]
(
− πX − π
E
X
ΣXX − π
E
X
ΣXX
)
Γ E + [− δ(− η)]
(
− πX − π
E
X
ΣXX − π
E
X
ΣXX
) < .
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But ∣∣∣∣ [− δ(− η)]
(
− πX − π
E
X
ΣXX − π
E
X
ΣXX
)
Γ E + [− δ(− η)]
(
− πX − π
E
X
ΣXX − π
E
X
ΣXX
) ∣∣∣∣ < 
for
(
− πX − π
E
X
ΣXX − π
E
X
ΣXX
)
Γ E > , that establishes a/.
For
(
− πX − π
E
X
ΣXX − π
E
X
ΣXX
)
Γ E < , a first necessary condition for the previous
restatement of the indeterminacy condition lies in the obtention of the same sign for the
numerator and the denominator, that can only obtain for∣∣Γ E ∣∣ < [− δ(− η)]∣∣(− πX − πEX ΣXX − πEX ΣXX)∣∣.
First consider the case −πX −π
E
X
ΣXX −π
E
X
ΣXX <  and where Γ E >  satisfies the
above condition. The previous indeterminacy condition then reformulates to:
−
{
Γ E + [− δ(− η)]
(
− πX − π
E
X
ΣXX − π
E
X
ΣXX
)}
> −[− δ(− η)]
(
− πX − π
E
X
ΣXX − π
E
X
ΣXX
) ,
that rearranges as
Γ E < −[− δ(− η)]
∣∣(− πX − πEX ΣXX − πEX ΣXX)/,
that is more stringent than the condition Γ E < −[ − δ( − η)]
∣∣( − πX − πEX ΣXX −
πEX Σ

XX
)
previously raised when Γ E > .
Then consider the case  − πX − π
E
X
ΣXX − π
E
X
ΣXX >  and where Γ E <  satisfies
the previous condition. Completing the same line of reasoning gives
−Γ E < [− δ(− η)]
∣∣(− πX − πEX ΣXX − πEX ΣXX)/.
that is in turn more stringent than the condition −Γ E < [−δ(−η)]
∣∣(−πX−πEX ΣXX−
πEX Σ

XX
)
previously raised when Γ E > .
Merging the two cases establishes b/. The details of Proposition 4 derive from straightforward
specialisations of the above lines of reasoning. △
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